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ARTICLE
USING TORT LAW TO UNDERSTAND THE
CAUSATION PRONG OF STANDING
Luke Meier*
Under current Supreme Court case law, a plaintiff does not have Article
III standing to sue in federal court unless that plaintiff can demonstrate
“causation.” The term “causation” is ubiquitous within the law. Because
of the frequency with which the term appears in various legal contexts,
however, the conceptual analysis associated with that term can vary.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never clearly established the
conceptual analysis necessary for making the causation determination
within standing law. Consequently, there is confusion on this question.
This Article addresses that confusion by relying on causation terms and
concepts fully developed within tort law. The term “causation” is
associated with the “proximate cause” and “cause in fact” analyses within
a standard negligence claim. In the early Supreme Court cases in which
the causation prong of standing was introduced, the Court most often used
cause in fact language in determining the causation prong of standing.
Upon a close inspection of these early Supreme Court cases, however, it
seems likely that the Court actually intended a proximate cause analysis.
Moreover, a proximate cause analysis is more consistent with the
“gatekeeping” function normally attributed to the standing requirement.
This Article argues that the causation prong of standing should be
interpreted as being analogous to the proximate cause doctrine within
negligence law. This interpretation would more closely align with the
intuitions that originally prompted the development of the causation prong
of standing. Moreover, a proximate cause interpretation would facilitate
the development of a clear procedure for determining standing at the outset
of litigation, thus fulfilling the “gatekeeping” function attributed to
standing.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baylor Law School. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the Junior Faculty Workshop at Washington University School of Law and also
as a work-in-progress at Drake University Law School. I am grateful for the numerous
helpful comments and suggestions I received while presenting the Article at both venues. I
would like to specifically thank Keith Miller for his patience and wise counsel as the themes
in this Article were developed. I am grateful to Jerry Anderson and Danielle Shelton for
their comments on drafts of this Article. Finally, I would like to thank Bill Powers, who
provided me with a solid introduction to the tort concepts discussed in this Article and who
has served as a valuable mentor and role model in my academic career.

1241

1242

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1242
I. CAUSE IN FACT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WITHIN TORT LAW............ 1246
A. Cause in Fact .......................................................................... 1247
B. Proximate Cause..................................................................... 1249
II. THE TERMINOLOGY USED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN DISCUSSING
THE CAUSATION PRONG OF STANDING ........................................ 1251
A. Linda R.S. v. Richard D.......................................................... 1253
B. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. ............................................................... 1256
C. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc. ........................................................................................ 1258
D. Allen v. Wright....................................................................... 1259
E. Proximate Cause Cases? Intervening or Superseding
Causes ................................................................................... 1259
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE GATEKEEPER FUNCTION OF
STANDING AND THE CAUSE IN FACT ANALYSIS .......................... 1265
A. Standing as a Gatekeeper ....................................................... 1265
B. The Fact-Intensive Nature of the Cause in Fact Inquiry ........ 1269
C. Creating a Procedure to Decide the Causation Prong of
Standing ................................................................................ 1270
1. As a Matter of Pleading ................................................... 1271
2. As a Disputed Issue of Fact for the Jury .......................... 1273
3. As a “Jurisdictional Fact” ................................................ 1275
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE AS A THRESHOLD DETERMINATION ................. 1278
V. RECONCILING A PROXIMATE CAUSE APPROACH WITH THE
SUPREME COURT’S CAUSE IN FACT LANGUAGE.......................... 1282
A. Early Cases Based on Proximate Cause Motivations............. 1282
B. The Supreme Court’s Tactics in Avoiding a Cause in Fact
Inquiry................................................................................... 1287
1. Avoiding Cause in Fact by Broadly Defining the
Plaintiff’s Injury .............................................................. 1287
2. Using the Parties’ Arguments to Avoid a Cause in Fact
Inquiry ............................................................................. 1295
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1297
INTRODUCTION
To satisfy the standing requirements deriving from the “cases” or
“controversies” language of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 1 a plaintiff
must show (1) an injury in fact, which is (2) fairly traceable to the
defendant’s misconduct (“causation”), and which can be (3) redressed by a
favorable decision of the court.2 This articulation of the standing
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 597–98 (2007).
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requirements deriving from Article III has been recited by the Supreme
Court for nearly thirty years, 3 but these requirements can be traced to cases
extending back even further. 4 This conceptualization has been the subject
of extensive academic criticism from the moment the current formulation of
standing was introduced to the most recent law review volumes. 5 The topic
of standing has attracted the attention of, and frustrated, some of the
nation’s best legal academics. 6
For the most part, the ubiquitous academic criticism of standing has
focused primarily on the injury prong of the standing analysis.7 This
Article will depart from the thrust of most standing scholarship by focusing
on the second prong: the “fairly traceable” or “causation” requirement.
This prong has mostly been ignored, or treated as a secondary
3. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (listing the Article III standing
requirements).
4. See id. (citing cases from the 1970s as precedent for the Article III standing
requirements). In addition to Article III standing requirements, the Supreme Court has also
identified several standing requirements that are “nonconstitutional prudential
considerations.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 331
(1990). The Court has been less precise in identifying prudential standing requirements, but
the most commonly recognized are: (1) the requirement that “a plaintiff’s grievance must
arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or
constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit,” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); (2)
the requirement that a plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975); and (3) a prohibition against “‘generalized grievance[s]’ shared in a
substantially equal measure by all or a large class citizens,” id. More recently, however, the
Court has tended to articulate the prohibition against generalized grievances as deriving from
Article III rather than prudential concerns. See, e.g., Hein, 551 U.S. at 597–98 (“We have
consistently held that [the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are
spent in accordance with the Constitution] is too generalized and attenuated to support
Article III standing.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (“We
have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”).
5. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 467–68
(2008) (arguing that the current standing doctrine does not achieve the purposes attributed to
the doctrine); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 68 (1984) (“In
perhaps no other area of constitutional law has scholarly commentary been so uniformly
critical [as in standing law].”).
6. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and
Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86
TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
‘Injuries,’ and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the
Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 719 (2007) (arguing that the injury prong
of standing “remains central in statutory standing cases” but that causation and redressability
are “another matter”); Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over Government Surveillance?, 57
UCLA L. REV. 71, 76 (2009) (“[A]lthough the familiar standing test contains three
constitutional prongs (injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability), the heart of the battle
over standing to challenge government surveillance concerns who, if anyone, has suffered a
judicially recognized injury-in-fact.”).
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consideration, in modern academic discussions on standing. 8 Partly
because of academic disinterest in this topic, uncertainty remains as to the
analysis required by the causation prong. 9 A major objective of this Article
is to shed light on this issue. 10
In order to accomplish this objective, I will utilize tort law. In particular,
I will frequently reference the concepts of “cause in fact” and “proximate
cause,” both of which are elements of a standard negligence cause of
action. 11 Modern tort law recognizes cause in fact and proximate cause as
distinct concepts serving separate purposes.12 This has not always been the
case. The “decoupling” of cause in fact and proximate cause is a relatively
recent phenomenon, 13 and one that continues in the most recent
Restatement (Third) of Torts. 14
A similar decoupling is needed for causation in the standing context.
Lower federal courts routinely struggle to apply the causation prong of

8. Most academic commentary discussing the causation prong of standing is dated. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 123 n.23 (6th ed. 2009) (listing “commentary on the Court’s early
development of the ‘causation’” prong of standing). When the causation prong of standing
is discussed, it is usually a secondary consideration to which relatively little attention is
devoted. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1505, 1544 (2008) (articulating a new theory of standing but devoting only one paragraph to
the causation prong of standing).
9. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.5,
at 295 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the “sea of uncertainty” associated with the causation prong
of standing).
10. The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), plainly demonstrates the need for a reconceptualization of the
causation prong of standing. In American Electric, the Court was unable to muster even the
most cursory analysis of the difficult causation questions implicated under current standing
doctrine. These issues had been addressed below by the Second Circuit, see Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 345–47 (2009), had been extensively briefed to the
Supreme Court, see, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (No.
10-174), 2011 WL 1393804, at *5 (discussing standing and causation), and implicated the
Court’s power to hear the case, see Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (acknowledging that
standing questions implicate the Court’s power over the dispute). The Court punted on the
question, however, stating—without analysis or explanation—that the Court was divided on
this issue and that it was affirming the exercise of jurisdiction by “an equally divided Court.”
See id.
11. See AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
109–10 (2003) (listing cause in fact and proximate cause as elements of a Negligence claim).
This Article will use the capitalized term “Negligence” to refer to the cause of action, as
distinguished from the breach of duty element of that cause of action, which is sometimes
confusingly referred to as the “negligence” element. See infra note 18.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. a (2005) (explaining that cause in fact and proximate cause address “two quite distinct
concepts” despite their common “causal terminology”).
13. See Paul J. Zwier, “Cause in Fact” in Tort Law—A Philosophical and Historical
Examination, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 774–75 (1982) (explaining that the decoupling of
cause in fact and proximate cause is a twentieth century phenomenon).
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. a (explaining the original “conflation” of cause in fact and proximate cause and the
efforts to decouple the concepts).
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standing because of uncertainty as to which analysis is required. 15 The
process of decoupling proximate cause from cause in fact within tort law
has resulted in a more cohesive tort doctrine. Employing the same
decoupling approach to causation within the standing doctrine can produce
the same effect. In fact, it leads to a somewhat startling conclusion: while
the terminology often used by the Supreme Court in discussing the
causation prong of standing suggests a cause in fact analysis, the actual
analysis employed by the Court under this element of standing is far less
clear.
To untangle the Supreme Court’s case law on this issue, this Article starts
by considering the purposes or functions generally attributed to standing.
Standing is often described as serving a “gatekeeper” function that is to
operate at the “threshold” of a federal lawsuit.16 The cause in fact language
frequently employed by the Supreme Court, however, is flatly inconsistent
with this conception of standing law. The cause in fact inquiry is fact
intensive; it requires the decision maker to draw inferences from evidence.
Having a cause in fact inquiry as part of the threshold standing analysis is
akin to forcing a square peg into a round hole; it is a horrible fit. Not
surprisingly, the Supreme Court has struggled mightily to develop a
procedural approach to causation that recognizes the gatekeeper function of
standing while also incorporating the cause in fact terminology found in its
opinions. This failure to develop a cohesive procedure is a symptom of an
underlying problem.
These procedural problems disappear, however, if the “fairly traceable”
or “causation” prong of standing is interpreted as requiring a proximate
cause analysis. Procedurally speaking, a proximate cause interpretation of
standing is a great fit with the gatekeeper function attributed to standing
law. A proximate cause analysis does not require a federal court to draw
inferences from evidence at the outset of litigation; instead, it requires a
court to ascertain the purposes behind the law on which the plaintiff relies
in bringing her suit. This sort of analysis is deferential to other branches of
government and is purely legal, as opposed to factual, in its scope. As such,
it is a comfortable task for federal courts to perform and can be easily
conducted at the threshold of litigation.
The superior “fit” of a proximate cause analysis within standing law
makes it a superior interpretation of the fairly traceable prong of standing.
Moreover, a close inspection of the early Supreme Court cases using cause
in fact terminology suggests that the Supreme Court most likely intended,
originally at least, a proximate cause analysis. Because of the failure to
properly decouple the two forms of causation, proximate cause concepts
were verbalized using cause in fact language. In subsequent Supreme Court

15. See, e.g., Saunders v. White, 191 F. Supp. 2d 95, 101–06 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing
conflicting approaches by district courts in applying the causation prong of standing within
the context of Equal Protection Clause claims).
16. See infra notes 146, 157–65 and accompanying text.
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cases, the Court has continued to employ cause in fact language but has
usually avoided engaging in a full-fledged cause in fact analysis.
As such, the Court should reformulate the causation prong of standing to
clarify that standing requires a proximate cause, rather than a cause in fact,
analysis. This interpretation of the causation prong of standing will solve
the procedural problems created by the current cause in fact language used
in the Court’s opinions and will be a better tool for implementing the
intuitions that originally prompted the Court to develop this branch of
standing jurisprudence.
The organization of this Article is as follows: Part I addresses how cause
in fact and proximate cause function as decoupled concepts within
Negligence law. Part II demonstrates that the Supreme Court has mostly
used a cause in fact vocabulary in explaining, and applying, the fairly
traceable element of standing. Part III explores the tension between the
fact-intensive cause in fact analysis and the gatekeeping function of
standing, using the Supreme Court’s failure to develop a comprehensible
threshold procedure for analyzing the fairly traceable element as a conduit
for examining the problem. Part IV illustrates how this tension is
eliminated if a proximate cause interpretation is employed. Part V
considers how a proximate cause interpretation would function within
existing Supreme Court case law. The Conclusion of the Article briefly
considers some of the manageable problems that would arise from a
proximate cause interpretation of the causation prong of standing.
I. CAUSE IN FACT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WITHIN TORT LAW
To gain a proper perspective on the current difficulties with the causation
prong of standing, it is first necessary to have an appreciation as to how
cause in fact and proximate cause operate as decoupled concepts within tort
law, particularly within Negligence law. Tort law is the perfect springboard
from which to delve into any discussion of causation. Although most law
students have pondered the difficulties of cause and effect well before law
school, for many, their first-year torts class is the first instance in which
causation concepts are concretely defined and explored. Thus, for many
lawyers, tort law has served as the formal introduction to the legal
difficulties associated with causation, and therefore provides a convenient
starting point for a discussion of standing causation.
Tort law is a nice springboard for another reason. Even though tort law
serves an introductory function to causation, it also, unfortunately, serves to
obfuscate the relevant concepts because of the terminology employed in a
Negligence cause of action. A Negligence claim is usually understood as
consisting of five elements 17: (1) a legal duty; (2) breach of duty (or

17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6
cmt. b (2005). This modern conceptualization of a Negligence cause of action is the result
of, and masks, numerous intellectual battles over the proper characterization of the tort. For
a history of the struggles over the proper characterization of the Negligence cause of action,
see generally William V. Dorsaneo III, Judges, Juries, and Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L.
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“negligence” 18); (3) cause in fact; 19 (4) proximate cause; and (5) damages.
The term “causation” is thus used in describing both the third and the fourth
element of a Negligence claim. The legal analysis performed under
elements three and four, however, is conceptually unrelated, despite sharing
the term “causation.” 20 As will be detailed below, this somewhat confusing
terminology employed in torts has probably contributed to the
contemporary confusion in understanding the causation prong of standing.
Tort law, then, serves as both an introduction to the topic at hand and a
source of some of the possible difficulties surrounding the causation
requirement in standing analysis. If the topic under consideration is
causation, tort law is the logical place to begin.
A. Cause in Fact
The cause in fact requirement in a Negligence claim is met if the plaintiff
can show a link between the defendant’s substandard or “negligent”
behavior (element number two—“the breach”) and the plaintiff’s injury or
damages (element number five). 21 This link is usually measured through
the “but-for” test, which asks: “But for the defendant’s negligent behavior,
would the plaintiff’s damages have occurred?” 22 If the plaintiff’s damages
REV. 1497, 1520–26 (2000); William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme
Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1699–1704 (1997).
18. The different connotations associated with the term “negligence” are one of the
many linguistic shortcomings in tort law. The word “negligence” is often used to refer to the
cause of action, which consists of the five elements identified in the text. The term is also
used to refer specifically to the second element of this cause of action (what I have labeled
“breach of duty” in the text), which requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted
below the level of care required, or “negligently.” As will be argued below, the linguistic
confusion surrounding the term “causation” is probably partly responsible for the Supreme
Court’s muddled standing jurisprudence. Thus, extreme attention will be given in this
Article to linguistic precision. Cf. Leon Green, The Study and Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1955) (“The earlier the law student realizes the nature of the language he must
utilize to do his study and develop his powers, the more quickly he should be on his way.
For these terms must be brought under strict control, however figurative, spongy, or fictional
they may seem. They will not respond to loose usage. Each serves some very definite
function.”). In this regard, the different uses of the term “negligence” will be avoided, when
possible, by using different language to refer to the second element of the cause of action
(“breach” or “substandard care”). When such efforts are more distracting than useful,
however, the different meanings associated with the term “negligence” will be demarcated
by capitalizing the first letter (“Negligence”) when referring to the cause of action, and using
the lower-case version (“negligence”) when referring specifically to whether the defendant
failed to exercise the care required.
19. Both the third and fourth element of a Negligence claim have been historically
identified by terms other than the ones used in this Article. This confusion will be discussed
in Part II.
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. a (2005).
21. See id. § 26 (“Tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to be
imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent
the conduct.”).
22. See id. § 26 cmt. b (“The standard for factual causation in this Section is familiarly
referred to as the ‘but-for’ test, as well as a sine qua non test. Both express the same
concept: an act is a factual cause of an outcome if, in the absence of the act, the outcome
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would have occurred even if the defendant had acted non-negligently, then
the defendant is not the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damages and cannot
be made liable through a Negligence claim. Consider a suit by a plaintiff
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident with a defendant. The
plaintiff argues that the defendant breached his duty to act reasonably
because the defendant was speeding when he hit an ice patch and lost
control of his vehicle (the plaintiff does not allege that any other conduct by
the defendant breached the standard of care). If the jury believes that, even
if the defendant had been going the speed limit, the accident (and the
plaintiff’s injuries) would have occurred anyway, the defendant is not liable
for the plaintiff’s injuries.
This type of causal connection is consistent with a tort system based on
retributive compensation. One of the obvious objectives of tort law is to
compensate those injured by the blameworthy behavior of others. 23 It is
necessary, then, to establish a link between the defendant’s blameworthy
behavior and the plaintiff’s injuries. A cause in fact analysis, using the butfor test, establishes this link.
There are a few characteristics of the cause in fact inquiry that are worth
emphasizing at this point, even though they will be explored in more detail
later, because they figure prominently in a proper understanding of the
difficulties the Supreme Court has had in developing the fairly traceable
requirement of standing. First, cause in fact is counterfactual. Determining
whether cause in fact exists under the but-for test requires a guess or
estimation as to what would have happened if the defendant had acted
consistently with the law’s requirements. 24 Thus, in a Negligence claim,
the cause in fact inquiry requires a guess as to whether the plaintiff would
still have been injured if the defendant had acted reasonably (in our
example, by driving the speed limit rather than speeding), instead of
unreasonably or “negligently.” As part of this analysis, it is first necessary
for the jury to determine how exactly the defendant should have acted under
the circumstances he was facing. 25 In our example involving the speeding
defendant, determining the exact conduct required of the defendant is
relatively easy: the defendant would have complied with his legal
obligation by driving no faster than the posted speed limit. But, as will be
demonstrated later, this step in the analysis has sometimes proven difficult
for the Supreme Court in the standing analysis, particularly for claims made
would not have occurred.”); see also id. § 26 reporters’ note on cmt. b (documenting the
widespread use of the “but-for” test for determining cause in fact).
23. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the “Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 768 (1987) (recognizing compensation
as one of the primary objectives of tort law).
24. See DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 122 (3d ed.
2004) (“[T]he ‘but for’ inquiry addresses a hypothetical situation: what would have
happened in the absence of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”).
25. See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1765, 1770 (1997) (explaining that under the cause in fact analysis “the defendant’s
wrongful conduct is now ‘corrected’ to the minimal extent necessary to make it conform to
the law’s requirements”).
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under the Equal Protection Clause. After the conduct that the law required
of the defendant is established, the cause in fact analysis requires a guess as
to how events would have played out if the defendant had acted according
to that required conduct.26 Sometimes, this analysis can be rather easy in a
tort claim. Consider injuries incurred after a defendant has run a red light
and caused an accident in the intersection. The conduct that was required of
the defendant was to stop at the red light. Common sense tells us that, if the
defendant had stopped, the various injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the
intersection accident would not have occurred. But in many cases,
establishing a cause in fact link between the defendant’s misconduct and the
plaintiff’s injuries will not be as simple. In these difficult cases, the
analysis will involve the weighing of evidence, often including the
persuasiveness of competing experts. Not surprisingly, the responsibility
for answering the cause in fact question is assigned to the jury in a
Negligence claim. 27 The plaintiff has the burden of proof on this question
and must prove cause in fact by a preponderance of the evidence; that is, the
plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that his injuries would not
have occurred if the defendant had acted legally. 28 As a fact question
(actually, a counterfactual question) to be answered by the jury, this
conclusion is reached only at the end of trial, after all of the evidence has
been received and all of the experts have testified.29 A judge’s legal
training provides her with no special expertise or insight into performing
the counterfactual inquiry required by cause in fact.
B. Proximate Cause
Although the fourth element in a Negligence cause of action shares the
“causation” moniker with the third element, the two analyses share little in
common on a conceptual level. 30 Proximate cause assumes that the
defendant’s illegal behavior was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries.31
Under a proximate cause analysis, the issue is whether the defendant should
nevertheless be shielded from liability. 32 Proximate cause is a concession
26. See id. at 1771 (explaining this part of the cause in fact analysis).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt. c(1) (2005) (explaining that cause in fact “is a question of fact normally left to the jury,
unless reasonable minds cannot differ”).
28. See id. cmt. a.
29. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 105–07 (3d
ed. 2007) (explaining the process by which the jury is expected to make the cause in fact
determination).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. b (2005) (“[P]roximate cause is only remotely related to factual causation.”);
ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 125 (“What does [proximate cause] have to do with causation?
Not much. . . . The determination that is made under the rubric of proximate cause has more
to do with negligence than with causation.”).
31. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 125–26 (explaining that proximate cause operates
after the other prerequisites to liability, including the cause in fact element, are met).
32. See id. at 124 (“[T]he doctrine of proximate cause operates as a limitation on the
scope of the defendant’s liability.”).
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that there are infinite consequences and harms resulting from every illegal
act. 33 Rather than hold a negligent defendant liable for all of the
consequences flowing from his unreasonable behavior, Negligence law
chooses to limit the scope of his liability. One way in which this limiting
function is achieved is through the proximate cause requirement. 34
This limiting function of proximate cause in Negligence law has been
performed through a variety of different tests. Most jurisdictions have now
settled on either the “foreseeability” test or the “scope of the risk” test.35
These tests essentially ask the same question: is the injury that occurred to
the plaintiff one of the reasons why the defendant’s conduct was determined
to be illegal (unreasonable, negligent, or a breach) in the first place? 36
Consider the following hypothetical: while driving home, I breach my
duty to act reasonably by driving 15 miles per hour over the speed limit.
Because of this negligent behavior, I am pulled over by a policeman and
given a ticket. Because of the ticket, I sign up to take a Saturday defensive
driving class a few weeks later in a remote part of town, which I would not
otherwise visit on a Saturday. A few weeks later, while driving (in a safe
and reasonable fashion) to the defensive driving class, the brakes on my car
suddenly (and without warning) fail. Because of the brake failure, I am
unable to navigate a turn and slam into a car parked on the side of the road.
The owner of the damaged automobile brings a Negligence claim against
me. The plaintiff concedes that I was driving carefully when the accident
occurred, that it was not possible to control my car, and that I am not to
blame for the brake failure, but argues that my breach was the decision to
speed home from work several weeks earlier. My act of speeding several
weeks before the accident was clearly a breach of my duty to act reasonably
and to drive the speed limit. It also was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s
damages: had I not been speeding, I would not have been handed a ticket,
would not have been on my way to the defensive driving class in a remote
part of town, and thus would not have hit the plaintiff’s vehicle parked
there.
Nevertheless, proximate cause does not exist for the plaintiff’s claim.
The damage which occurred to the plaintiff’s automobile, and the manner in
which it occurred, was not one of the reasons my breach was considered
negligent in the first place—the plaintiff’s injuries were not a foreseeable
result of speeding weeks earlier. Speeding is negligent because the speed
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. a (2005) (“No serious question exists that some limit on the scope of liability for
tortious conduct that causes harm is required.”).
34. Thus, the Restatement (Third) of Torts attempts to clarify the limiting purposes
served by proximate cause by using the label: “Scope of Liability (Proximate Cause).” See
id. § 29.
35. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 124 (“Most cases posing the issue of proximate
cause can be resolved by the foreseeability test or by a closely related elaboration, the harmwithin-the-risk test.”).
36. See ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 172 (describing this approach as “what
courts actually do” in “a significant number of cases” despite employing various names for
their tests).
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can increase the frequency and severity of accidents. However, the risk that
motorists will be involved in future accidents while driving to take care of
their resulting speeding tickets is not one of the reasons that we consider
speeding to be negligent behavior.
The above explanation of proximate cause is cursory. Any lawyer who
can recall her first year torts class can attest to the subtleties that lie beneath
the surface. 37 Some of these complexities are discussed later in this Article,
but at this point, it is only necessary to recognize how cause in fact and
proximate cause are decoupled within tort law, despite their common
causation terminology.
II. THE TERMINOLOGY USED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN DISCUSSING THE
CAUSATION PRONG OF STANDING
Considering the completely different analytical functions performed by
cause in fact and proximate cause, one would presume that it would be easy
to identify which of the two concepts is represented by the fairly traceable
or causation requirement of Article III standing. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. For the most part, the language used by the Court suggests a cause
in fact interpretation of the fairly traceable prong. In this part, I sample
some of the cases in which the Court is using clear cause in fact language to
discuss the fairly traceable prong of standing. I also examine a set of cases
involving “intervening causes,” which appear to employ proximate cause
language in discussing the fairly traceable prong of standing. Although I
later look beyond the language employed by the Court in an attempt to
identify the actual analysis guiding the Court’s standing conclusions, this
part only considers the words actually used by the Court.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the Supreme Court opinions
concerning the causation prong of standing, it is perhaps helpful to briefly
document the formidable challenges posed by the causation lexicon. As
discussed above, tort law has successfully decoupled proximate cause and
cause in fact as conceptual matters; tort law has been much less successful,
however, in coalescing around an established vocabulary for the concepts
involved. For instance, the idea that there must be a factual link between a
defendant’s wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s injury (what this Article terms
as “cause in fact”) has been expressed using a variety of words or tests:
“cause in fact,” “actual causation,” 38 “factual causation,” 39 “the ‘but-for’
test,” “the substantial factor test,”40 and “the sine qua non test.” 41 The
37. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 127–28 (explaining the confusion and difficulties
often encountered in this analysis).
38. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1813
(1985) (using the term “actual causation”).
39. See generally ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL
CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961) (using the term “factual
causation”).
40. The substantial factor test is an alternative test for finding a causal relationship
between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s misconduct. It is most appropriately used
when no causal relationship exists under the but-for test, but a causal relationship seems
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function performed by what I have termed “proximate cause” has also been
expressed using a variety of terms, including “scope of liability” 42 and
“legal cause.” 43 There are a multitude of tests for determining whether
proximate cause exists, with most jurisdictions having now settled on either
the foreseeability test or the scope of the risk test.44 Complicating matters
even further is that often the same term has been used to refer to both the
cause in fact and proximate cause concepts.45 For instance, jury
instructions in many states still do not clearly separate the distinct cause in
fact and proximate cause analyses that the jury is expected to perform in a
Negligence case.46
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s selection of the term “fairly
traceable” to describe the second prong of the modern standing analysis
does little to minimize the potential confusion that can arise because of the
convoluted tort terminology. Indeed, the Court would be hard-pressed to
pick a term that could better obfuscate. The word “traceable” is mostly
consistent with a cause in fact inquiry. It is defined as “able to be traced
to.” 47 A fundamental aspect of this definition is that it involves a
connection between two things or ideas. As has already been discussed,
cause in fact connects the defendant’s inappropriate behavior with the
plaintiff’s injury. 48 The essence of the inquiry is whether the defendant’s
misconduct can be linked to the plaintiff’s harm. The word “fairly,” on the
other hand, connotes a proximate cause inquiry. As previously discussed,49
proximate cause serves to limit the defendant’s liability for certain
consequences, despite the defendant’s behavior being a cause in fact of the
plaintiff’s harm: “No serious question exists that some limit on the scope of
liability for tortious conduct that causes harm is required.”50 The answer to
the proximate cause question has always been grounded in policy
intuitively to exist. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 reporters’ note on cmt. j (2005) (“[T]he substantial-factor test can be useful
because it substitutes for the but-for test in a situation in which the but-for test fails to
accomplish what the law demands.”).
41. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 103 (using the term “sine qua non test”).
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6
(using the term “scope of liability”).
43. See Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st Cir. 1955) (suggesting that “legal
cause” and “proximate cause” are synonymous terms).
44. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
45. The Restatement (Second) of Torts attempted to address both the cause in fact and
proximate cause concepts under the umbrella term of “legal cause.” See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 6 special note on proximate
cause. Similarly, the substantial factor test has been used for determining proximate cause,
in addition to its intended use as a test for cause in fact. See id. § 29 cmt. a.
46. See id. § 29 cmt. b (“Unfortunately, most standard jury instructions use the term
‘proximate cause’ and include within its instructions on both factual cause and scope of
liability.”).
47. See WordNet, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn
(search “traceable”) (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
48. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. a.
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judgments about how much liability for negligent behavior is appropriate.51
One way to answer this policy-laden question is by considering what is
“fair”: “An important consideration in the decision to impose liability is
fairness to the actor.” 52 In this sense, then, the Court could not have picked
a more ambivalent phrase than “fairly traceable” in terms of obscuring the
two different types of analyses that are commonly associated with the term
“causation.”
Despite the challenges posed by the confusing terminology, a careful
reading of the Court’s opinions reveals that the Court has most often used
language consistent with a cause in fact understanding, rather than a
proximate cause understanding, of the fairly traceable prong of standing.
This is particularly true in cases in which the Court has discussed the fairly
traceable element with more than a cursory analysis.53 Below, I examine
some of these early Supreme Court cases in which cause in fact vocabulary
is expressly used. In addition, I analyze a set of Supreme Court cases in
which proximate cause language appears to be used, but which are
consistent with the cause in fact vocabulary used by the Court in other
cases.
A. Linda R.S. v. Richard D.
Although the term “fairly traceable” was never used in the Linda R.S. v.
Richard D. 54 opinion, most commentators attribute this requirement of
standing to that decision. 55 The case involved a suit brought by the mother
of an illegitimate child against, among others, the state of Texas and a
Dallas County District Attorney. 56 The baby’s father had not been paying
51. At least, this is the modern, realist understanding of the proximate cause element.
During the formalist era of American jurisprudence, the proximate cause analysis was
sometimes portrayed as being a “scientific” inquiry. See William Powers, Jr., Reputology, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1941, 1951 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY
IN REPUTATION (1990)) (describing the formalist view of proximate cause as “an outgrowth
of the ‘law-as-science’ mindset of the late nineteenth century”).
52. THOMAS C. GALLIGAN ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, PERSPECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS 290
(4th ed. 2007). Of course, “fairness” considerations are not the only way in which a policyladen issue can be approached. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. e (discussing the extensive literature addressing
the efficiency and administrative considerations in the proximate cause determination).
53. For an example of a case in which the fairly traceable requirement is resolved
cursorily, see Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476 (1987) (“Because the alleged injury stems
from the Department of Justice’s enforcement of a statute that employs the term ‘political
propaganda,’ we conclude that the risk of injury to appellee’s reputation ‘fairly can be
traced’ to the defendant’s conduct.” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 41 (1976))).
54. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
55. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at 76 (5th ed. 2007); 13A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3531.5, at 296 (“The current story of causation as an element
of standing begins with Linda R.S. v. Richard D.”); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37, 45 (“[C]ausation was first
expressly recognized as an article III requirement in the 1973 decision of Linda R.S. v.
Richard D.”).
56. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 335 F. Supp. 804, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
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child support. 57 Pursuant to a Texas state policy of not prosecuting fathers
of illegitimate children for child support, Dallas County prosecutors had
refused to prosecute the father.58 The plaintiff argued that this policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 59
The Court, per Justice Marshall, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
the case, 60 concluding that the plaintiff was not “entitled to invoke the
judicial process.” 61 The Court reasoned that there was only a “speculative”
link between the plaintiff’s injury of not receiving child support payments
and the state of Texas’s alleged Equal Protection violation in enforcing their
child support regime only on behalf of legitimate children: “[I]f appellant
were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the
child's father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future,
result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.”62
Justice Marshall is clearly using cause in fact language in Linda R.S. to
support his conclusion that the plaintiff is without standing. Recall the
formulation of the but-for test from Negligence law: “But for the
unreasonable conduct of the defendant, would the plaintiff have been
injured?” 63 Justice Marshall’s language in Linda R.S. duplicates the but-for
analysis from Negligence law: but for the defendant’s failure to comply
with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, would the plaintiff
have received child support payments from the father?64
57. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 615.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 616.
60. Id. at 619.
61. Id. at 616.
62. Id. at 618.
63. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
64. Actually, Justice Marshall’s language is slightly different than the but-for cause in
fact analysis found in tort law. Tort law looks at the relationship between the defendant’s
misconduct and the plaintiff’s injury from a retrospective vantage point, while Justice
Marshall’s cause in fact analysis was framed from a prospective vantage point. Regardless,
the analysis is the same in that it requires an examination of the relationship between the
defendant’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s injury; whether it is from a prospective or
retroactive perspective, it is still a cause in fact type of analysis. Indeed, one can rephrase
Justice Marshall’s analysis as retroactive without altering the meaning suggested by his
language: “We believe that, if the father in this case had been prosecuted, the harm to the
plaintiff (not collecting on child support payments) would likely have occurred anyway. The
father probably would not have made child support payments from jail.” So for present
purposes, it is irrelevant that Justice Marshall’s cause in fact language is framed
prospectively, rather than retroactively (as in Negligence law).
Under modern standing doctrine, however, Justice Marshall’s analysis should
probably be categorized under the “redressability” prong of standing, rather than the
causation or fairly traceable prong of standing. The redressability prong of standing has
been understood to raise the same type of causal inquiry as the causation prong of standing
analysis, except that redressability looks at the causal connection between the court’s order
(ordering the defendant to cease the illegal conduct) and the plaintiffs’ requested relief. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 75 (discussing causation and redressability as involving a
similar analysis); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 125 (stating that “inquiries into
causation and redressability often overlap”). Nevertheless, despite the prospective language
used by Justice Marshall, commentators continue to label Linda R.S. as a case decided under
the causation prong of standing, see, e.g., Logan, supra note 55, at 70–76 (discussing Linda
R.S. as a causation case), and the Supreme Court has done the same, see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
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Justice Marshall says that the answer to this question is “speculative.”65
This language is cryptic. The cause in fact analysis is, of course, by its
nature speculative. 66 Recall that a cause in fact inquiry first requires that
the appropriate conduct by the defendant be identified. In a run-of-the-mill
Negligence case, the appropriate behavior required by the defendant will
often not be difficult to identify. For instance, if the defendant was
negligent because he was speeding, the but-for test asks whether the
plaintiff would have been injured had the defendant been driving the speed
limit. Similarly, if the defendant was negligent for failing to stop at the stop
sign, the but-for test asks whether the plaintiff would have been injured had
the defendant stopped at the stop sign. In Linda R.S., this cause in fact
inquiry is slightly more difficult because there are two potential ways to
“correct” the defendant’s illegal behavior. The state defendants’ alleged
misconduct in Linda R.S. was in prosecuting the fathers of legitimate
children, but not those of illegitimate children, for failing to make child
support payments. 67 This alleged Equal Protection violation could be
“corrected” by prosecuting all fathers, regardless of whether their children
are legitimate or illegitimate, or by not prosecuting any fathers. Justice
Marshall seemed to bypass this particular problem by assuming that Texas
would remedy their Equal Protection violation by prosecuting all fathers.68
This difficulty, however, does not appear to be the “speculative” problem
with which Justice Marshall was concerned in Linda R.S.
Rather, the language of Justice Marshall’s opinion indicates that the
problem is in linking this hypothetical policy to the plaintiff’s injury: “The
prospect that prosecution will . . . result in payment of support can, at best,
be termed only speculative.” 69 Here, the term “speculative” does not really
describe the type of analysis engaged in (recall that the cause in fact
analysis is always speculative), but rather the probability that such a link
between the policy and injury exists. Justice Marshall wrote: “[I]f
appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the
jailing of the child's father.” 70 A reasonable interpretation of Justice
Marshall’s language would suggest the following thought process:
We are going to assume that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a
scheme in which Texas enforces child support obligations against the
fathers of legitimate children but not of illegitimate children. 71 And we
268, 298 n.6 (1979) (discussing Linda. R.S. in the context of causation requirements of
standing).
65. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.
66. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
67. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 616.
68. Id. at 618.
69. See id. (discussing the “jailing of the child’s father”).
70. Id. Justice Marshall’s conclusion that prosecution and jailing of the father would not
result in payment to the mother is, of course, “speculative” as well, although Justice
Marshall apparently believes that his “speculation” is more probable than the speculation
that the plaintiff’s attorneys had urged the Court to adopt in the case.
71. The court decided this “merits” issue in a companion case. See Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973) (striking down the Texas policy as unconstitutional).
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are going to assume that Texas would correct this violation by enforcing
child support obligations against all fathers, whether of legitimate or
illegitimate children. Even if Texas had a policy of enforcing child
support payments against illegitimate fathers, however, it seems doubtful
that this policy would have produced actual payments to the plaintiff in
this case. The child’s father might have concluded that jail time was
preferable to child support payments; or, the child’s father might simply
have had no money to make payments, so the threat of prosecution would
not have prompted payments to the plaintiff in this case.

Although the language used by Justice Marshall in Linda R.S. would
clearly suggest that Justice Marshall was engaging in the cause in fact
analysis described above, I believe the reality is much more complicated.
Later in the Article, I argue that the intuitions pushing Justice Marshall (and
the rest of the Court) to a conclusion that the plaintiff lacked standing were
actually of the proximate cause variety, but that the Court used cause in fact
language to verbalize these intuitions. 72 In any event, focusing only on the
language actually used by the Court in Linda R.S, there is no doubt the
Court used cause in fact terminology.
B. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.
The first Supreme Court opinion to specifically use the term “fairly
traceable” as a standing requirement was Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 73 As in Linda R.S., the Court
used cause in fact language in describing the standing analysis. 74 In
Arlington Heights, the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
(Developer) planned to build low-income townhouses. 75 In conjunction
with those plans, the Developer applied for the necessary rezoning of a 15acre parcel of land from single-family use to multi-family use. 76 After the
application was denied by the Village zoning authorities, suit was brought
alleging that the denial was based on racially discriminatory motivations
and was thus contradictory to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. 77 One of the plaintiffs was a black man who alleged
that, because of the lack of low-income housing in the area, he had to
commute to his job in Arlington Heights from a residence approximately
twenty miles away. 78 The Court opined that this was a sufficient injury to
justify standing, and that the injury was “fairly traceable” to the Board’s
decision, 79 which the Court assumed—at least at this stage of the analysis—
was motivated by racial bias and, thus, in violation of the Equal Protection
72. See infra Part V.
73. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
74. See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 254.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 264. This plaintiff was the basis of the Court’s conclusion that standing
existed in the case. See id. at 264 n.9.
79. Id.
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Clause. 80 The Court conceded that the Developer would still have to
“secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies, and carry though with
construction” 81 if the rezoning was granted, but that there was a
“‘substantial probability’” that this would occur.82 The Court concluded
that all housing projections entail “similar uncertainties” 83 and that further
inquiry would involve “undue speculation.” 84
Here again, the language used by the Court in applying the fairly
traceable requirement is undoubtedly of the cause in fact variety. The
Court’s language suggests that a link between the plaintiff’s injury (failure
to find affordable housing in close proximity to his work) and the
defendant’s alleged unconstitutional behavior (a decision to deny a rezoning
application based on discriminatory intent) is necessary, and that there was
a “substantial probability” that this link existed.85 Furthermore, as in Linda
R.S., the Court justified its standing conclusion with the use of the term
“speculative.” 86 In Linda R.S., the plaintiff’s argument—that a Texas
policy consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause
would have resulted in child support payments to her—was “speculative”
and thus the basis for a conclusion that standing was lacking. 87 In
Arlington Heights, however, it was the defendant’s argument—that the
plaintiff would have been injured regardless of the alleged unconstitutional
behavior of the defendant—that Court regarded as “undue speculation.”88
80. See id. On the merits, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the Village’s
denial of the rezoning was not motivated by unconstitutional racial discrimination. See id. at
270–71.
81. Id. at 261.
82. Id. at 264 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)). The Court assumed
that the rezoning would be granted once unconstitutional racial discrimination was removed.
Id. at 264. But as the Court’s decision on the merits (that is, whether the Village in fact had
based their denial on unconstitutional racial animus) reveals, this assumption was probably
not appropriate. Even assuming that the Village’s denial of the rezoning was based on
unconstitutional racial animus, this does not mean that a rezoning application considered
without racial animus would be approved. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283–86 (1977) (discussing how a government might have reached the
same conclusion as the one allegedly motivated by an unconstitutional consideration even if
it had considered only constitutionally permissible factors). Thus, although the Court is
clearly engaging in a cause in fact analysis in this instance, the Court erred in failing to
consider the possibility that the zoning application would have been denied even without
unconstitutional racial discrimination.
83. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 264. Within Negligence law, a plaintiff has to prove a cause in fact link
between the defendant’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s injury by a “preponderance of the
evidence,” meaning simply that the causal relationship must be more likely than not. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. a
(2005). It is not clear how a “substantial probability” requirement compares to the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard.
86. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261–62 (“[A] court is not required to engage in
undue speculation as a predicate for finding that the plaintiff has the requisite personal stake
in the controversy.”).
87. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
88. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261–62.
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In both situations, however, the use of the term suggests a cause in fact
inquiry.
C. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.
The Supreme Court again employed cause in fact terminology in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. 89 In Duke Power,
individuals residing near the location of two proposed private nuclear
power plants brought suit as part of an effort to prevent the construction of
the plants. 90 The plaintiffs claimed that the proposed nuclear power plant
would have negative consequences for their residential life, including the
decline of property values, the emission of radiation, the fear of radiation,
and changes to area recreational waters. 91 One of the plaintiffs’ legal
strategies was to seek a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act, which
limited the civil liability of private developers of nuclear energy in the event
of an accident, was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. 92 The Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had
standing, 93 including the “difficult [causation] step in the standing
inquiry.” 94 The Court largely deferred to the District Court’s conclusion
that “a ‘but for’ causal connection between the Price-Anderson Act . . . ‘and
the construction of the nuclear plants’” had been established. 95 Duke
Power argued that the power plants in question would have been built even
without the Price-Anderson Act, either by private companies willing to
assume the risk of nuclear power production without the Act’s protection
from civil liability or by government-financed projects. 96 The Court noted
that the district court’s finding that the power plants would not have been
privately built, absent the Price-Anderson Act, was based on testimony
given by private companies interested in nuclear power during the
Congressional hearings on the Price-Anderson Act. 97 The Court rejected as
“speculative” Duke Power’s argument that, even without the PriceAnderson Act, a nuclear power plant would have been built in the plaintiffs’
neighborhood. 98
Once again, the cause in fact language is unmistakable. In fact, the Duke
Power opinion’s use of cause in fact language is perhaps the most blatant of
the various standings cases in question, as the Court expressly relied on the
but-for test to determine cause in fact.99

89. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
90. Id. at 67.
91. Id. at 72–73.
92. Id. at 67–68.
93. Id. at 81.
94. Id. at 74.
95. Id. (quoting Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 431
F. Supp. 203, 219 (W.D.N.C. 1977)).
96. Id. at 75.
97. Id. at 75–76.
98. Id. at 77–78.
99. See id. at 74.
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D. Allen v. Wright
Cause in fact language was also famously used in Allen v. Wright 100 as
part of the basis of the Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs in that case
lacked standing. 101 In Allen, parents of black schoolchildren brought suit
against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, claiming that the defendants were neglecting to follow tax code
provisions that deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private
schools. 102 The Court acknowledged that, to the extent that the plaintiffs’
children were denied the benefit of a desegregated education, they had
stated a cognizable injury, thus satisfying the first prong of the Article III
standing analysis. 103 The Court concluded, however, that causation
“between the challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury” was
lacking. 104 The Court stated:
The diminished ability of respondents’ children to receive a desegregated
education would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants of tax
exemptions only if there were enough racially discriminatory private
schools receiving tax exemptions in respondents’ communities for
withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in
public school integration. . . . [I]t is entirely speculative . . . whether
withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the
school to change its policies. . . . It is just as speculative whether any
given parent of a child attending such a private school would decide to
transfer the child to public school as a result of any changes in educational
or financial policy made by the private school once it was threatened with
loss of tax-exempt status. It is also pure speculation whether, in a
particular community, a large enough number of the numerous relevant
school officials and parents would reach decisions that collectively would
have a significant impact on the racial composition of the public
schools. 105

Again, this is clearly cause in fact language. Even if the IRS has enforced
the tax code in the manner the plaintiffs thought was legally required, the
Court doubted a but-for causal link between the plaintiff’s injury and the
alleged illegal conduct.106
E. Proximate Cause Cases? Intervening or Superseding Causes
The discussion above demonstrates the frequent use of cause in fact
language by the Court in applying the fairly traceable prong of standing.
The Court has continued to employ the cause in fact language—established
in these early cases—in recent cases such as Massachusetts v. EPA.107
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

468 U.S. 737 (1984).
See id. at 758–59; infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 739–40.
Id. at 756–57.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 758 & n.23.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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Some of these are discussed later in the Article. This section, however,
addresses a few Supreme Court cases that appear to use proximate cause
language, rather than cause in fact language, in discussing the causation
prong of standing. 108 These cases involve, to borrow a tort phrase,
“intervening” or “superseding” causes.109 Upon close inspection, however,
it becomes apparent that the language used by the Supreme Court in these
cases is intended as cause in fact, rather than proximate cause, language.
Under Negligence law in most states, a defendant is allowed to argue that
his or her liability is “cut off” by the subsequent conduct of other parties
that occurred after the defendant’s negligent conduct, but before the
plaintiff sustained his injuries.110 For example, in the famous case of
Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & Railroad Co., 111 the plaintiff
brought a Negligence claim against a railroad for injuries suffered in an
explosion. 112 The railroad had negligently spilled gasoline, which
subsequently exploded after a man tried to light a cigar in the area.113
Although its negligence was clearly a cause in fact of the explosion (the
man would not have been injured but-for the railroad’s negligence in
spilling the gasoline, in the absence of which there would have been no
explosion), the railroad defended on the ground that its liability was cut off
by the “intervening” conduct of the gentlemen who lit the cigar.114 The
Kentucky Supreme Court determined that the railroad’s liability to the
plaintiff was “superseded” only if the gentleman lighting the cigar had acted
in a “wanton or malicious” manner, but not if he was merely negligent. 115
While in a case like Watson the presence of an intervening human cause
is a proximate cause issue, an intervening human cause can also influence a
cause in fact analysis by making the “but-for” test more difficult to apply.
Consider the tort case of Britton v. Wooten. 116 Britton involved a
Negligence suit by a landlord against a tenant to recover damages after the
leased premises were destroyed in a fire.117 The landlord’s claim was based
108. In one opinion, Justice Brennan even used the term “proximate cause” in discussing
the fairly traceable prong of standing. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
477 (1982) (“In the absence of direct guidance from Congress, and faced with the claim that
a particular injury is too remote from the alleged violation to warrant § 4 standing, the courts
are thus forced to resort to an analysis no less elusive than that employed traditionally by
courts at common law with respect to the matter of ‘proximate cause.’”).
109. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 129–30.
110. There is some indication that states are moving away from this as an independent
concept. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 34 cmt. a (2005) (“Were it not for the long history of intervening and superseding causes
playing a significant role in limiting the scope of liability, this Section would not be
necessary. However, to address the substantial body of law on this subject and to explain the
bases for its declining importance, this Section is necessary. Subsequent Comments also
identify the areas of substantial current agreement in the waning influence of supersedingcause jurisprudence and the areas that yet remain in flux.”).
111. 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1910).
112. Id. at 147.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 150.
115. Id. at 150–51.
116. 817 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1991).
117. Id. at 444.
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on the alleged negligence of the tenant in stacking flammable trash outside
the leased premises, up to its combustible roof. 118 The record revealed that
a third-party had intentionally lit the stored material and started the fire.119
The trial court granted summary judgment to the tenant defendant, on the
ground that the arson served as a “superseding cause as a matter of law,
thereby breaking the chain of causation.”120 The trial court’s proximate
cause conclusion was based on the Watson rule that an intentional
superseding human cause relieves the original wrongdoer of Negligence
liability. 121 In Britton, the Kentucky Supreme Court sided with “modern
tort law” and rejected the tenant’s superseding cause, proximate cause
argument. 122 As such, the court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant tenant.123 The remaining issue on
remand was “whether the [landlord] can prove that the [tenant] caused or
permitted trash to accumulate next to its building in a negligent manner
which caused or contributed to the spread of the fire and the destruction of
the [landlord’s] building.” 124 Here, the court is referencing potential cause
in fact difficulties arising from the fact that the fire was a result of the
intentional act of an arsonist.125 Even if the landlord could prove that the
defendant had, in fact, stacked rubbish alongside the building, and if the
jury concluded that this conduct was negligent,126 there was still a
remaining issue as to whether the negligent behavior of the tenant was a
cause in fact of the building’s damage: but for the negligent stacking,
would the fire damage to the building have occurred? The conduct of the
arsonist, which was relevant to the tenant’s attempted proximate cause
argument, was also relevant to the cause in fact issue. Indeed, the cause in
fact issue was more complex because of the existence of this intervening
cause. Would the arsonist have engaged in the same criminal activity if his
goal of burning down the building had not been made easier by the rubbish
stacked outside the leased building? Even if an arsonist would have
attempted to burn down the building without the rubbish located outside,
would he have been successful? These questions, asked pursuant to the
cause in fact analysis, were more difficult to answer because of the presence
of the intervening arson. Recall, however, that the proximate cause issues
arising from the intervening arson had already been disposed of by the
appellate court.
Britton nicely demonstrates that the presence of a third party—an
intervening or superseding cause—can be relevant to a cause in fact inquiry.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 445.
121. Id. at 448–49.
122. Id. at 452.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 451–52.
125. See id. at 448.
126. It seems that if the tenant had engaged in this behavior, it would have been negligent
per se because it violated Kentucky statutes addressing the disposal of waste. See id. at 444.
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In this regard, Britton provides needed context for the string of cases in
which the Supreme Court references an intervening or superseding cause
while conducting an analysis under the fairly traceable prong of standing.
A typical statement by the Court involving intervening causes can be found
in Bennett v. Spear 127: “[T]here [must] be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury must be fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court . . . .” 128 It is tempting to
conclude that the reference to an independent third party is proximate cause
language. 129 Careful consideration, however, reveals that this language is
probably intended as an extension of the cause in fact language described in
the previous section.
The Court’s opinion in Bennett demonstrates that the Court’s frequent
references to third parties are consistent with its typical cause in fact
language. Bennett involved a dispute over the Klamath Irrigation Project,
which is operated by the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau).130 The Klamath
Irrigation Project had been used by many irrigation farmers and ranchers as
a source of water for decades. 131 In 1992, the Bureau notified the Fish and
Wildlife Service (Service) that the Bureau’s continued operation of the
Klamath Irrigation Project might threaten two species of sucker fish that
lived in the project waters and which had been listed as endangered by the
Secretary of the Interior under the Endangered Species Act.132 The Bureau
was required to give the Service this notification under parameters
established by the Endangered Species Act, which requires that all federal
agencies consult with the Service if they believe that federal action might
adversely affect a listed species.133 After receiving this notification from
the Bureau, the Service produced a Biological Opinion (as required by the
Endangered Species Act) that recommended that the Bureau maintain
minimum water levels in operating the Klamath Irrigation Project.134 The
Bureau indicated an intention to comply with the Biological Opinion, even
though following the recommendations would impair the availability of
water for some irrigation and rancher users.135 By complying with the
Biological Opinion, the Bureau shielded itself from the criminal and civil

127. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
128. Id. at 167.
129. Some commentators have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8, at
1544 (“The common law analogue to the fairly traceable test is the proximate cause
requirement in torts.”). Litigants have also drawn the same conclusion. See Bennett, 520
U.S. at 168 (“‘If petitioners have suffered injury,’ the Government contends, ‘the proximate
cause of their harm is an (as yet unidentified) decision by the Bureau regarding the volume
of water allocated to petitioners, not the biological opinion itself.’” (quoting the respondent’s
brief)).
130. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 157.
131. Id. at 158–59.
132. Id. at 159.
133. Id. at 157–58.
134. Id. at 159.
135. Id. at 159–60.
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liabilities imposed on federal agencies who “take” a species in violation of
the Endangered Species Act. 136
Suit was brought against the Service by the irrigation farmers and
ranchers whose water supply would be depleted once the Bureau began
following the Biological Opinion’s recommendations. 137 The plaintiffs
claimed that, in preparing the Biological Opinion, the Service had failed to
comply with certain requirements of the Endangered Species Acts,
including a consideration of the economic impact of their recommendation
and using the “‘best scientific and commercial data available.’” 138 The
Service challenged the plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit.139 On the fairly
traceable issue, the government argued that the harm to the plaintiffs—the
decrease in the amount of water which would be available to them if the
Klamath Irrigation Project was operated consistently with the Biological
Opinion—was a result of the Bureau’s decision and not the Service’s
allegedly illegal Biological Opinion: “‘If [the plaintiffs] have suffered
injury . . . the proximate cause of their harm is an (as yet unidentified)
decision by the Bureau regarding the volume of water allocated to
petitioners, not the biological opinion itself.’”140 In other words, the
Service was arguing that, between their illegal Biological Opinion and the
harm to the plaintiffs, there was the intervening or superseding cause in the
form of the Bureau’s independent decision to follow the Opinion’s
recommendations, and that this intervening or superseding cause should
preclude a finding that the plaintiffs’ harm was fairly traceable to the
misconduct of the Service.
The Court rejected the proximate cause argument of the Service because
the plaintiffs had, in the Court’s mind, satisfied the cause in fact analysis:
[The Service’s argument] wrongly equates injury “fairly traceable” to the
defendant with injury as to which the defendant’s actions are the very last
step in the chain of causation. While, as we have said, it does not suffice
if the injury complained of is “th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court,” that does not exclude injury
produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone
else. 141

Because the Bureau had operated the Klamath Irrigation Project in the
same manner for almost a century before the Service’s Biological Opinion,
the Court determined that a cause in fact link existed between the plaintiffs’
136. Id. at 169–70.
137. Id. at 159.
138. Id. at 176 (quoting Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994)).
139. Id. at 160–61.
140. Id. at 168 (quoting the respondent’s brief).
141. Id. at 168–69 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992))
(internal quotation omitted). Although the Court usually uses cause in fact language in
discussing the fairly traceable prong of standing, Bennett is one of the rare cases in which the
Court is actually applying a cause in fact analysis. Later in this Article, I demonstrate that
the Court has often eschewed a cause in fact analysis, despite using cause in fact
terminology. See infra Part V.
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injury and the defendant’s misconduct. The Court believed that the Bureau
would not have independently decided to restrict the water available to the
plaintiffs, 142 and thus the erroneously prepared Biological Opinion was the
but-for cause of this harm to the plaintiff.143 In the suit against the Service,
then, the conduct of the Bureau was relevant, not because the Court was
interested in pursuing a proximate cause superseding cause analysis, but
because a cause in fact analysis required an analysis of the Bureau’s
behavior.
142. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170–71.
143. The Court probably erred in conducting its cause in fact inquiry when it said that “it
is not difficult to conclude . . . that [plaintiff’s] injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the Service’s
Biological Opinion.” Id. The but-for test does not ask whether the plaintiff’s injury would
have occurred but-for the defendant’s conduct, but whether it would have occurred but-for
his misconduct. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007)
(“‘A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly
unlawful conduct . . . .’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))); Allen, 468
U.S. at 757 (1984) (denying standing because “the injury alleged is not fairly traceable to the
Government conduct respondents challenge as unlawful” (emphasis added)); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973) (“[A]ppellant has failed to allege a sufficient nexus
between her injury and the government action which she attacks to justify judicial
intervention.”). But see Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 667 (2003) (stating that the
plaintiff’s injury must be “‘fairly traceable’ to actions of the opposing party” (quoting
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162)). The concept is lucidly explained, in the tort law context, by
Professor Abraham:
There are many causes in fact—but-for causes—of any event. Being a cause in
fact is not the same as what, in common parlance, would be called the
“responsible” or the main cause of an occurrence. In an automobile collision case,
if the defendant’s parents had not met, if the defendant had not travelled to work
on the day of the collision, if the defendant had not gone to college, bought a car,
or run the red light, he would not have collided with the plaintiff. The key is
whether one of these many but-for causes was negligent. If so, then the act or
omission of the party responsible for this negligence is “a” cause in fact.
ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 104.
The Court’s mistake in Bennett was assuming that cause in fact had been
demonstrated simply because the Service’s Biological Opinion caused the Bureau’s conduct.
On this point, the evidence was overwhelming, considering that the Klamath Irrigation
Project had been operated for decades and that the change in operation occurred directly
after the Service’s Biological Opinion. It is much more difficult, however, to determine
whether the plaintiff’s harm was related to the Service’s allegedly illegal conduct in
preparing the Biological Opinion. The claims asserted by the plaintiffs in Bennett rested on
alleged statutory violations in preparing the Biological Opinion: the Service was clearly
within their legal authority in drafting such an Opinion, but had allegedly failed to use the
“‘best scientific and commercial data available’” and had failed to consider the economic
impact of their recommendation. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 176 (quoting Endangered Species Act
of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994)). Thus, the proper cause in fact inquiry in Bennett
would have asked whether the harm would have occurred but for the procedural violations in
preparing the Biological Opinion. In other words, if the Service had used the best scientific
and commercial data available, and if it had considered the economic impact, would the
Service have produced such a different Biological Opinion that the harm to the plaintiffs
would not have occurred?
After the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bennett, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon struck down the Service’s Biological Opinion. See Bennett v. Spear, 5 F. Supp. 2d
882, 886–87 (D. Or. 1998). This ruling merely continued a long legal battle involving the
Klamath Irrigation Project, of which Bennett is but a small part. For a fascinating account of
this history, see HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN
(2008).
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Similar to the tort context (as represented by the Wooten case), when a
standing analysis requires an estimation of a third party’s likely response to
the hypothetical behavior of a party to the litigation (as in Bennett), the
cause in fact analysis becomes more complex. As Justice Scalia stated in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 144:
[When] [t]he existence of one or more of the essential elements of
standing [such as causation] “depends on the unfettered choices made by
independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and
legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to
predict,” . . . it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts
showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as
to produce causation . . . . 145

This difficulty of considering the likely behavior of third parties under
different scenarios arises pursuant to a cause in fact analysis. These
intervening cause cases, then, are consistent with the cause in fact language
used by the Court in other cases such as Linda R.S., Arlington Heights,
Duke Power, and Allen.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE GATEKEEPER FUNCTION OF STANDING
AND THE CAUSE IN FACT ANALYSIS
Part II considered various Supreme Court cases employing cause in fact
language to decide the causation prong of standing. If this cause in fact
language represents the true analysis being performed by the Court,
however, problems arise. Standing is a “threshold” determination that
serves a gatekeeper function: “In essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute . . . .” 146 Yet the fact-specific nature of the cause in fact inquiry
makes it difficult to conduct this inquiry at the threshold of litigation, and
thus it is irreconcilable with the gatekeeper function of standing. This
inherent tension is evident in the Supreme Court’s bewildering attempts to
develop a procedure for deciding the fairly traceable prong of standing.
A. Standing as a Gatekeeper
In discussing the standing requirements derived from Article III of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that standing goes
to the power of a federal court to resolve a dispute: “The case-orcontroversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in
our system of government.” 147 Because standing requirements derived
from Article III implicate the power of a federal court over a dispute, these
144. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
145. Id. at 562 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.)).
146. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
147. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (“The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have
‘standing’ to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these
doctrines.”); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
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requirements are described as jurisdictional.148 Accordingly, issues
concerning standing can be raised at any point in the litigation, either by a
litigant 149 or by a court sua sponte.150 Congress is without power to confer
on federal courts the ability to hear disputes which do not comport with the
standing requirements derived from Article III. 151
The placement or location of the prudential aspect of standing is a bit
more uncertain. 152 The Court has also consistently stated that Congress can
“override” prudential standing limitations.153 Simply because Congress can
abrogate prudential standing concerns does not necessarily mean, however,
that the prudential standing rules are not jurisdictional or that they do not
relate to the power of a federal court to address a dispute. Congress has the
authority to determine the subject matter of cases that federal courts can
hear, yet this inquiry is still considered to be jurisdictional and as
addressing the power of the federal courts.154 The Court has been
somewhat ambiguous about whether prudential standing requirements are
also jurisdictional, despite the fact that they can be trumped by Congress.155
Not surprisingly, there is disagreement on this point in the federal circuit
courts. 156
148. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998)
(“Having found that none of the relief sought by respondent would likely remedy its alleged
injury in fact, we must conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit, and that
we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it.”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349
n.1 (1996) (noting that standing is jurisdictional).
149. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 n.1 (holding that standing is not subject to a waiver by a
party litigant).
150. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (“We are
obliged to examine standing sua sponte where standing has erroneously been assumed
below.”); see also 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3531.15, at 311 n.13 (listing cases
affirming this principle).
151. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
152. See supra note 4 (discussing non-constitutional, prudential standing considerations).
153. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (stating that prudential standing doctrines “can be
modified or abrogated by Congress”); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Reps.,
525 U.S. 316, 328–29 (1999) (determining that Congress had defeated the zone of interest
impediment by permitting any person to challenge the statistical approach used in the
census). The conceptualization of “prudential” standing rules as something than can be
modified or overridden by Congress is confusing. It is probably more conceptually accurate
to state that Congress (or other governmental bodies that establish legal rights) determines
the parameters of these “prudential” standing concerns in the first place.
154. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 266 (“[A] federal court may adjudicate a case
only if there is both constitutional and statutory authority for federal jurisdiction.”).
155. Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1998)
(distinguishing prudential standing from constitutional standing in holding that constitutional
standing must be addressed before determining the merits question of whether a plaintiff has
a cause of action under a federal statute, but that merits questions can be decided before
prudential standing concerns such as the zone of interest requirement), with United Food &
Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996)
(“[T]he prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass ‘several judicially selfimposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984))), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“Apart from this
minimum constitutional mandate, this Court has recognized other limits on the class of
persons who may invoke the courts’ decisional and remedial powers.”).
156. Compare Gilda Indus. Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(holding that the zone of interest test is not jurisdictional and is thus waived if not properly
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The Court has consistently reiterated that standing is a determination that
is separate from the merits of a dispute: “[S]tanding in no way depends on
the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.”157
Somewhat related to the idea that the standing question is distinct from the
merits of a dispute is the concept that standing is a threshold determination,
which the Supreme Court has often indicated. 158 There are two possible
consequences of applying the term “threshold” to standing. One is to
reiterate that the standing analysis is jurisdictional and that, unless standing
is present, a court has no power to entertain the suit. As described above,
this conception of standing as a threshold issue is clearly reflected in the
Court’s jurisprudence. Without standing (or at least without the standing
requirements emanating from Article III), a federal court is without power
over a dispute. As a threshold question, then, standing must be determined
before proceeding to the merits, which are not related to the power of a
court over a suit. This is the basis of the Court’s holding in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 159 in which the Court rejected
“hypothetical jurisdiction” and held that Article III standing issues must be
decided before addressing whether a particular statute provides the plaintiff
with a cause of action. 160 The term “threshold” in this context thus serves
to indicate the order in which issues must be decided in litigation.161
asserted), and Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1087 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“[B]ecause the zone of interest test is merely prudential rather than constitutional it is
waivable, and Defendants have waived it by not raising it below.”), with Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The zone of interests test is jurisdictional,
so that it is our duty to consider the issue regardless of the defendants’ failure to raise the
issue in this court (as in this case) or in the trial court.”).
157. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109–10 (concluding that if
the plaintiff lacks standing, a “resolution of the merits . . . will have to await another day”);
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (“The ‘legal
interest’ test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different.”).
158. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (“Having reached the end of what seems like a long
front walk, we finally arrive at the threshold jurisdictional question: whether respondent, the
plaintiff below, has standing to sue.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569
(1992) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (stating that standing is a threshold inquiry); Warth, 422 U.S. at
498 (“In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff
has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning
of Art. III. This is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the
court to entertain the suit.”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973) (stating that
whether the plaintiff “is entitled to invoke the judicial process [and whether] the facts alleged
present the court with a ‘case or controversy’” are threshold questions).
159. 523 U.S. 83.
160. Id. at 93–102.
161. In recent cases, the Court has taken up the “sequencing” issue involved in Steel Co.,
which some commentators refer to as “jurisdictional resequencing.” See generally Scott C.
Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (2001). In Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999), the Court
determined that a case can be dismissed because of defects in personal jurisdiction before
addressing a difficult question involving the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at
578. In Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422
(2007), the Court extended the Ruhrgas analysis to the threshold question of forum non
conveniens, despite acknowledging that the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens
was not jurisdictional and did not implicate the power of a court to adjudicate the dispute.
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The other consequence of applying the term “threshold” to standing is to
indicate that standing must be decided at the outset of litigation. This
understanding of threshold is related to, but slightly different than, the
understanding of threshold discussed in the preceding paragraph. The first
understanding of threshold means only that jurisdictional issues such as
standing must be decided before other issues in a lawsuit; this is primarily a
doctrinal point. The second understanding of threshold addresses when in a
lawsuit standing issues must be decided. The second understanding of
threshold further implicates the question of how standing issues are
decided, who decides them, and on what information they may be decided.
This second understanding of the term “threshold” is a procedural point.
It seems relatively clear that, in describing standing as a threshold matter,
the Court has intended both the doctrinal and procedural aspects associated
with that word. The Steel Co. case directly addressed the doctrinal
sequencing point. The procedural points have never been as firmly
addressed, but nevertheless a general understanding seems to have emerged.
First, on the question of who decides the issue, although never specifically
addressed, it seems clear that standing is a legal question that must be
determined by a court rather than a fact question to be determined by a
jury. 162 Second, on the question of when to decide the issue, the general
consensus seems to be that standing decisions are most usefully determined
early in a lawsuit. 163 As Professors Wright and Miller have stated, it is
desirable “to decide standing at the outset [of litigation], as a means of
sorting out those suits that do not deserve to proceed toward trial on the
merits.” 164 Sometimes this concept is described as a gatekeeping
function. 165 This conception of standing (including the fairly traceable
See id. at 429–30, 435–36. The Sinochem Court emphasized, in a unanimous opinion, that
forum non conveniens could be the basis of a dismissal, even before addressing the difficult
jurisdictional issues raised by the dispute, because forum non conveniens is a threshold issue
clearly distinct from the merits of the case. See id. On the sequencing question, then, this
trio of cases seems to clearly demarcate threshold inquiries from merits questions, with the
former requiring resolution before the latter, but no particular order required for the
resolution of the various threshold (even non-jurisdictional threshold) questions.
162. See, e.g., 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3531.15, at 328 n.25 (listing cases
holding that “[s]tanding is a question of law” and “regularly assum[ing] that there is no right
to jury trial on the preliminary issue of standing” (citing Am. Postal Workers Union of L.A.
v. U.S. Postal Service, 861 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1988); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778,
784 (9th Cir. 1979))); Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope:
Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 919, 948–49 (2008)
(discussing standing as an issue that is decided by a judge as a question of law); Nancy C.
Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52
EMORY L.J. 771, 777–78 (2003) (same).
163. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, §3531.15, at 308.
164. Id.; see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV.
643, 650–51 (2005) (“Any doubts about subject-matter jurisdiction should be raised and
resolved at the threshold of litigation; a federal court should not reach the merits of a claim
unless and until it has satisfied itself that it is the proper forum and that it has the structural
authority to resolve the legal and factual issues presented by the dispute between the present
parties.”).
165. See, e.g., Kelsey McCowan Heilman, Comment, The Rights of Others: Protection
and Advocacy Organizations’ Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 249
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requirement) as a threshold issue to be determined at the outset of litigation
seems intuitively correct: if the federal court lacks power over the case, this
characteristic should be identified as quickly as possible.
B. The Fact-Intensive Nature of the Cause in Fact Inquiry
The notion that standing must be decided early in a lawsuit has proven
problematic, particularly with regard to the causation requirement. In order
to understand this difficulty, it is necessary to recall the nature of the cause
in fact inquiry. In a Negligence case, cause in fact is treated as a fact
question for the jury to determine at the end of trial, and only after
considering all of the evidence presented by the litigants.166 Indeed, cause
in fact is treated as a jury question not just under Negligence law, but
throughout all tort law.167 Further, when cause in fact is relevant in a
lawsuit outside the torts arena, it is also considered a question for the
factfinder. 168
As discussed in Part I, however, the jury is not resolving a “fact”
question in the sense that they are determining what actually happened in
the real world. For instance, when a jury acts as factfinder in a criminal
case, the jury is determining whether the defendant committed the crimes he
has been charged with. 169 There is a right and wrong answer to this
question, because the defendant either did or did not act as the prosecutor
alleges. These types of pure “what happened” fact questions also arise in
tort law—for example, was the defendant speeding when the accident
occurred? But cause in fact is counterfactual. The jury is not asked to
determine what actually happened; it is asked to determine what would have
happened if the defendant had acted legally rather than illegally.
If cause in fact is not really a true “what happened” fact question, then
why is it considered a question for the jury to resolve? In short, because
juries are usually in as good, if not better, position than judges to make the
cause in fact determination:

(2008) (“The standing doctrine, then, can be viewed as playing a gatekeeper function,
admitting only true cases or controversies that will be vigorously litigated in a manner that
presents the strongest arguments on each side, thus promoting the correct legal outcome.”).
166. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 105–07 (discussing how cause in fact is a question
for the jury to be decided at the end of trial after hearing all of the evidence).
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
(2005) (“Tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to be imposed.”); id.
§ 28 cmt. a (“[T]he plaintiff has the burden of proof on factual causation, . . . which requires
that the factfinder be persuaded from the evidence that factual causation more likely than not
exists.”); id. § 45 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (explaining that factual causation is
also required for recovery of emotional disturbance).
168. See, e.g., Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN.
L. REV. 569, 584–85 (1988) (describing the jury’s role in determining cause in fact within
breach of contract claims).
169. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 35–36 (2003) (discussing
factfinding role of jury).
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[T]he jury must rely on its own experience and knowledge of the world to
make its decision about what would have happened. Indeed, this
“counterfactual” nature of the causation issue sometimes requires
assuming that the jury has firm knowledge about the way the world works
that none of us actually has. 170

Sometimes the cause in fact analysis will involve an evaluation of expert
witnesses and other trial evidence.171 Other times, common sense and
experience are the primary tools in determining cause in fact.172 In either
situation, the counterfactual determination is typically a task for a jury, and
a judge is in no better position than a jury to address it. In any event, it is
widely accepted that if the issue to be decided requires the evaluation and
weighing of documentary evidence and testimonial witnesses, or the
application of real-world experience and common sense, it is a question for
the jury. 173
Consider the tension created between the counterfactual nature of the
cause in fact analysis and the notion that standing must be determined at the
outset of litigation. Federal courts are asked to do a counterfactual analysis
that they are not especially well equipped to perform; in other areas of the
law, the counterfactual analysis is assigned to a jury. Moreover, the
information on which a federal court will base this decision is not readily
available at the outset of litigation. Recall that a jury determines cause in
fact after having weighed all of the evidence presented at trial:
From his understanding of, and experience with, the world, the trier of
fact [is] required to make a judgment that certain effects follow certain
antecedents. To ascertain whether a cause in fact existed, the trier of
fact’s ‘judging capacity’ need[s] to be furnished with enough evidentiary
facts to enable him, based on his experience, to rationally connect the
defendant’s act with the plaintiff’s injury . . . . 174

If federal judges are to determine cause in fact as part of a threshold
standing inquiry (to be ascertained at the outset of litigation), then judges
must either: (1) make the cause in fact determination without the benefit of
evidence that litigants can bring to bear on that question; or (2) require that
this evidence be brought forward earlier in the litigation than normally
required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. Creating a Procedure to Decide the Causation Prong of Standing
The tension created by the cause in fact language used by the Supreme
Court in standing decisions and the threshold function of standing is evident
in the Court’s somewhat tortured efforts to develop a cohesive procedure
170. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 105.
171. See id. at 106–07.
172. Id. at 105–06.
173. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that
“weighing facts and considering the credibility of witnesses . . . ha[ve] been the hallmark of
the jury tradition”).
174. See Zwier, supra note 13, at 776 (quoting Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Causein-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 61 (1956)).
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for district court judges to use in resolving the cause in fact inquiry.
Professors Wright and Miller have stated: “The procedural means for
resolving standing issues are not as clearly defined as might be
imagined.” 175 The causation requirement is mostly responsible for this
procedural confusion.
The Supreme Court has waffled between two different procedural
approaches for determining the causation prong. Under the first approach,
it is determined on the pleadings. Under the second, it is treated as a factual
issue that would be decided at trial. Both of these procedural approaches
are seriously flawed. A third approach exists—treating the issue as a
“jurisdictional fact”—but it is only slightly superior to the other two.
1. As a Matter of Pleading
In early cases, the Court sometimes viewed the causation issue as
something that could be resolved on the pleadings. In introducing the fairly
traceable requirement in Linda R.S., and in subsequently determining that
this requirement had not been met, the Court indicated that the defect was
in the plaintiff’s pleadings: “[A]ppellant has failed to allege a sufficient
nexus between her injury and the government action which she attacks to
justify judicial intervention.” 176
Subsequent Court cases wrestling with the cause in fact inquiry also
leave the impression that the issue can often be disposed of on the
pleadings. Consider the Court’s determination in Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization177 that the fairly traceable
requirement had not been met. 178 In Simon, several indigents and
organizations representing indigents brought suit against the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue because of the IRS ruling allowing particular hospitals
to be eligible for favorable tax treatment, even though those hospitals
denied regular medical care to indigents.179 The indigent plaintiffs argued
that the ruling violated several federal statutes180 and, further, that the
plaintiffs were harmed by the ruling because fewer hospitals would offer
free medical care to indigents after the allegedly illegal ruling. 181
The Court determined that the fairly traceable element had not been met:
“It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the
complaint fairly can be traced to [the allegedly illegal revenue ruling] or
instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax

175. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3531.15, at 301.
176. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973); see also id. at 616 (“The
threshold question which must be answered is whether the appellant has ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure . . . concrete adverseness . . . .”
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
177. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
178. Id. at 41–43.
179. Id. at 28.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 32–33.
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implications.” 182 The Court specifically noted that the fairly traceable
element could be decided on a motion to dismiss: “[I]n this case the
complaint is insufficient even to survive a motion to dismiss, for it fails to
allege an injury that fairly can be traced to [the] challenged action.”183
It is difficult to understand what additional pleadings the plaintiffs
needed to include in Simon to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs had pled an injury; they had pled illegal conduct by the
defendant; and they had pled that there was a causal link between the IRS’s
decision and their injury. How much more specifically can you plead a
counterfactual occurrence—something that never happened in the real
world? Granted, a plaintiff can always plead additional facts which, if true,
would serve as evidence of the likely existence of the issue that is necessary
for the plaintiff’s case. Traditionally, at least, the pleading of evidence has
not been necessary under the liberal “notice pleadings” approach of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which the plaintiff’s complaint
serves the purpose only of alerting the defendant to the factual basis of legal
claims against him. 184 Historically, the pleadings have not been viewed as
an opportunity to consider the likelihood that the facts alleged by the
plaintiff are true. 185
Of course, this traditional view of the complaint has been questioned
recently. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 186 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,187 and
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 188 the Court has revisited the
method for testing the sufficiency of a complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 189 The Dura case is particularly pertinent because it
involved the causation requirement in securities fraud litigation, which
requires a plaintiff to show that her economic loss has been caused by the
defendant’s material misrepresentation or omission. 190 In Dura, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased shares of Dura Pharmaceuticals
stock in reliance upon the defendant’s false representations and that, when
the falsity of these statements became known, the price of Dura
182. Id. at 42–43.
183. Id. at 45 n.25.
184. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (“Specific facts are not necessary;
the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation omitted)); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only a statement
“that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests”); see also Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456–58 (1943)
(explaining the limited purposes of pleadings).
185. See generally Luke Meier, Why Twombly Is Good Law (but Poorly Drafted) and
Iqbal Will Be Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
186. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
187. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
188. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
189. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875 (2009) (“Many judges and academic commentators read the
decision as overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading practice, and critics have
attacked it as a sharp departure from the ‘liberal ethos’ of the Federal Rules . . . .”).
190. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341–42.
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Pharmaceutical shares dropped.191 Despite these pleadings, which were
quoted in the opinion, the Court determined that the plaintiffs’ complaint
failed to adequately allege economic loss caused by the defendant’s
misrepresentation. 192
It is not clear what effect Dura, Twombly, and Iqbal might have on the
appropriate procedure for determining standing. 193 As discussed more fully
in the next section, by the time the Twombly and Iqbal cases were decided,
the Supreme Court had mostly abandoned the view that the fairly traceable
requirement can be determined solely on the basis of defects in the
plaintiff’s pleadings. In addition, the fairly traceable issue is fundamentally
different than most issues pled by a plaintiff in federal court. This is
because the fairly traceable issue is one that must be resolved by a court at
the outset of the proceedings if standing is to continue to function in a
gatekeeper capacity. In this sense, it is entirely “plausible”194 that standing
might be exempt from the new heightened pleading requirements, because
the Court, as decision maker, will resolve any issues before the necessity of
a full-blown discovery process and jury trial. In short, the court is already
performing a gatekeeper function with regard to standing, so it is not
necessary to manipulate pleading doctrine to perform this function.
2. As a Disputed Issue of Fact for the Jury
The effect of the recent Supreme Court cases involving heightened
pleading standards on standing jurisprudence remains to be seen. But
before these cases, the Court was clearly moving away from the notion that
standing causation could be decided solely on the pleadings. For instance,
in Lujan, the Court stated: “At the pleading stage, general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for
191. Id. at 339.
192. It seems probable that the plaintiffs in Dura were proceeding under a different
understanding of the legal requirements under federal securities laws. The plaintiffs
appeared to believe that buying securities in reliance on defendant’s misrepresentations, at a
price that is artificially inflated because of those misrepresentations, constitutes actionable
loss, which was the Ninth Circuit’s position. See Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339
F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court rejected this understanding, requiring
instead that a plaintiff show that, after the defendant’s misrepresentations were exposed, the
value of the share price decreased. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–46. However, in the
complaint in Dura, the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants had falsely claimed that it
expected FDA approval for a new medical device and that, after the FDA announced that it
would not approve that device, Dura’s stock price “temporarily fell but almost fully
recovered within one week.” See id. at 339. This pleading would seem to flatly contradict
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that “the defendant’s
misrepresentation . . . proximately caused the plaintiff’s economic loss.” Id. at 346. The
plaintiffs might not have specifically labeled the stock price drop as evincing their loss, and
it is probable that the plaintiffs were proceeding under a different theory, but the Court’s
conclusion on this point seems prickly.
193. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1,
6–7 (2009) (discussing the confusion on the appropriate standard to apply to a plaintiff’s
pleadings on a motion to dismiss).
194. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
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on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”195
Unfortunately, the manner in which the Court has described the postpleadings procedures for resolving standing has also engendered confusion.
Consider the Court’s extensive discussion on the topic in Lujan:
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
these elements. Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather
an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required
at the successive stages of the litigation. . . . In response to a summary
judgment motion, . . . the plaintiff can no longer rest on such “mere
allegations,” but must “set forth” by affidavit or other evidence “specific
facts,” which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken
to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be
“supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.” 196

The Court properly outlines the procedures a trial court should use for
fact questions that the jury will ultimately resolve after a full trial. If
standing is to serve as a gatekeeper, however, this objective is defeated by
delaying the ultimate determination on the causation prong of standing until
a full-blown jury trial. While this approach would remedy the problem
created by requiring a federal court to decide potentially complicated cause
in fact questions solely on the pleadings, it undermines the notion that
standing is a threshold determination that must be resolved at the outset of
litigation. Moreover, it is not clear just who would be resolving this
question. Justice Scalia’s Lujan opinion could be read to indicate that a
jury would resolve disputed issues of cause in fact about which reasonable
minds could differ. 197 In other cases, the Supreme Court has also intimated
that a jury would be asked to determine the cause in fact question.198
Asking a jury to make determinations that affect the federal court’s
jurisdiction is problematic. Professor Mishkin stated long ago that the
“power of the court to hear and decide a case could hardly be made to

195. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (alteration in original)
(quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)); see also Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 171 (1997) (describing the plaintiffs burden at the motion to dismiss stage as
“relatively modest”).
196. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Gladstone,
Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979)).
197. See id.
198. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64–
66 (1987) (“If the defendant fails to make such a showing after the plaintiff offers evidence
to support the allegation, the case proceeds to trial on the merits, where the plaintiff must
prove the allegations in order to prevail. But the Constitution does not require that the
plaintiff offer this proof as a threshold matter in order to invoke the District Court’s
jurisdiction.”); Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 115 n.31 (“Although standing generally is a
matter dealt with at the earliest stages of litigation, usually on the pleadings, it sometimes
remains to be seen whether the factual allegations of the complaint necessary for standing
will be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.”).
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depend upon the jury’s verdict.” 199 Regardless of whether a jury or judge
would make this determination, however, the gatekeeper aspect of standing
would be completely undermined if this determination was not made at the
outset of litigation, but rather after the completion of a full trial.
3. As a “Jurisdictional Fact”
Resolving the fairly traceable prong under a cause in fact analysis at the
pleading stage is difficult because of the fact-intensive nature of that
inquiry, but waiting to resolve the issue until after a full trial undermines
the gatekeeper aspect of standing. Thus, neither of the two procedural
approaches suggested by the Supreme Court’s case law is satisfactory for
resolving a cause in fact analysis under the fairly traceable prong of
standing. A third procedural approach is possible.
Occasionally, a disputed factual question arises in determining the
threshold question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a
claim. 200 For instance, factual questions may arise over the domicile of a
party for purposes of determining whether there is diversity of citizenship.
These disputed “jurisdictional facts” 201 need not be resolved by a jury, and
instead can be resolved by the court after reviewing the evidence on the
disputed point. 202 The Supreme Court has sanctioned this approach in
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 203 in a case
implicating the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction204: “[A]ny litigation of a
contested subject-matter jurisdictional fact issue occurs in comparatively
summary procedure before a judge alone . . . .” 205 This summary
199. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157, 166 (1953).
200. The federal appellate courts have coined the term “factual challenge” to refer to a
motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) in which the movant
challenges the factual underpinnings of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See 2 JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[4] & n.11 (3d ed. 2011) (listing
cases distinguishing between “factual attacks” and “facial attacks”).
201. See Stefania A. Di Trolio, Comment, Undermining and Unintwining: The Right to a
Jury Trial and Rule 12(b)(1), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1247, 1247 (2003) (“Jurisdictional
facts are facts that are alleged and ultimately proven to establish subject matter jurisdiction
in federal courts.”).
202. See id. at 1248–49 (explaining that, except in unusual circumstances, jurisdictional
facts are determined by the court rather than by the jury).
203. 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
204. Ironically, the Court’s opinion spoke at length about the propriety of determining
proximate cause under a statutory jurisdictional analysis when proximate cause was also a
part of the merits dispute. See id. at 536–37. When a jurisdictional fact is the same as a fact
that must be resolved as part of the plaintiff’s cause of action, the procedure for a federal
court to apply in resolving this fact is much more complicated and much less clear. See
Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 980–84 (2006)
(examining the two leading cases addressing the procedure a federal court should use when a
jurisdictional fact overlaps with a fact that is necessary to the merits dispute); Di Trolio,
supra note 201, at 1248 (discussing how federal courts should proceed when a jurisdictional
fact is intertwined with the merits of the case).
205. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 537–38; see also U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 79 (1988) (“Nothing we have said puts in question the
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procedure, however, can include “affidavits, documents, and even a limited
evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.” 206
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court reviewed an appeal from a district
court that treated the fairly traceable element of standing as a jurisdictional
fact to be resolved with the court acting as a factfinder.207 In order to
resolve the difficult cause in fact question presented in that case, the district
court held a four-day hearing and took live testimony. 208 The Supreme
Court also considered the relevance of a large volume of statistical
information presented by the parties.209 In affirming the cause in fact
conclusions reached by the district court, the Supreme Court was extremely
deferential to the district court’s analysis,210 even indicating that the Court
reviewed the district court’s cause in fact conclusions under the “clearly
erroneous” standard. 211 The clearly erroneous standard of review is used
by an appellate court for reviewing factual determinations made by a lower
court. 212
inherent and legitimate authority of the court to issue process and other binding orders,
including orders of discovery directed to nonparty witnesses, as necessary for the court to
determine and rule upon its own jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over the subject
matter.”); Idleman, supra note 161, at 60–61 (“[A] court ‘has the power to resolve any
factual dispute regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction’ and ‘may hold an
evidentiary hearing . . . necessary to evaluate its jurisdiction.’” (quoting Gould, Inc. v.
Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911
F.2d 1405, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990)) (second alteration in original)).
206. 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 200, at § 12.30[4] & n.11. Some commentators have
concluded that the burden of proof necessary to establish a “jurisdictional fact” is the same
for “any factual element . . . of forum authority.” Clermont, supra note 204, at 1020. But see
5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1351, at 288–313 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the procedures for determining a challenge to
personal jurisdiction and stating that a federal court will “resolve all factual disputes” in
favor of the nonmoving party, that the district court has “considerable procedural leeway in
choosing a methodology for deciding” a 12(b)(2) motion, and that a court “may await the
trial on the merits with the fact issues being left to the jury for determination if the district
judge believes that is desirable”).
207. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) (“[T]he
District Court concluded that ‘there is a substantial likelihood that Duke would not be able to
complete the construction and maintain the operation of the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear
Plants but for the protection provided by the Price-Anderson Act.” (quoting Carolina Envtl.
Study Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 220 (W.D.N.C. 1977))).
208. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 431 F. Supp. at 205 (“[A]t a hearing on the motion to
dismiss, it appeared that full dress consideration was desired on the issues of standing and
ripeness. Time was allotted, therefore, to develop evidence, and a hearing, four days in
length, was conducted on September 27, 29 and 30 and October 1, 1976, on these
subjects.”).
209. See id. at 214 (listing and considering the statistical evidence submitted by the
parties). In the opinion, the district court commented that “[t]he court is not a bookie.” Id.
210. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 76 (stating that the evaluation of testimony “is the
primary responsibility of the trial judge”).
211. See id. at 77 (“Considering the documentary evidence and the testimony in the
record, we cannot say we are left with ‘the definite and firm conviction that’ the finding by
the trial court of a substantial likelihood that the McGuire and Catawba nuclear power plants
would be neither completed nor operated absent the Price-Anderson Act is clearly erroneous;
and, hence, we are bound to accept it.” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948))).
212. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).
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If a cause in fact inquiry is truly a proper component of the threshold
jurisdictional standing inquiry, Duke Power represents the appropriate
procedural approach for resolving the issue. This approach recognizes the
fact-intensive nature of the cause in fact inquiry, but still allows this
question to be determined at the outset of litigation (or at least before a full
jury trial). In this sense, treating standing as a jurisdictional fact is superior
to the two procedural approaches which have been suggested by the
Supreme Court.
Treating the issue as a jurisdictional fact might be the best resolution of
the tension between the gatekeeper aspect of standing and the fact-intensive
nature of the cause in fact inquiry, but it also illustrates how difficult these
concepts are to reconcile. Requiring a federal court to independently verify,
as a threshold determination of the federal court’s jurisdictional power, a
causal relationship between the plaintiff’s asserted injury and the alleged
misconduct by the defendant will often prove to be cumbersome and
tedious.
As detailed above, jurisdictional facts sometimes arise in the
determination of other threshold inquiries, such as determining whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction. For the most part, these other
threshold inquiries only rarely require the resolution of a jurisdictional fact
by a federal court: “[T]he ‘jurisdictional facts doctrine’ is quite narrow,
confined largely to party-based, as opposed to subject-matter-based, grants
of federal jurisdiction.” 213 Jurisdictional facts are rarely necessary under
the Court’s subject matter jurisprudence because the substantive doctrine
for these other threshold areas has been shaped to permit a relatively
straight-forward analysis at the outset of litigation. For instance, federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is analyzed according to the
“well-pleaded” complaint rule, which scrutinizes the plaintiff’s complaint to
see if it raises a question of federal law. 214 Similarly, whether a federal
court has diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 is analyzed pursuant to the
“complete diversity” rule.215 Although this approach can lead to factual
disputes over which state is a party’s domicile, 216 such factual disputes are
rare. 217 A cause in fact analysis of the fairly traceable prong of standing,
however, seems to frequently require a jurisdictional fact inquiry.
In conclusion, the fact-intensive nature of the cause in fact inquiry and
the desire to make this determination at the outset of litigation are in
tension. If a cause in fact analysis must be performed at the threshold of
213. See Wasserman, supra note 164, at 699.
214. See, e.g., Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830
(2002) (“The well-pleaded complaint rule has long governed whether a case ‘arises under’
federal law for purposes of § 1331.”).
215. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 302–03 (explaining the rule).
216. See Di Trolio, supra note 201, at 1247 (noting that disputes arise over parties’
citizenship); see also 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3611, at 469 (indicating that one’s
citizenship is based on the state in which she is domiciled).
217. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3611, at 472 (“[I]n the majority of cases
there is no dispute over where a party’s true home is located.”).

1278

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

litigation, there is no obvious procedural mechanism to accomplish this
purpose. The best approach is the one taken for other jurisdictional facts,
but this procedure contemplates a cumbersome process at the outset of
litigation and would presumably require that the parties be allowed
discovery on this issue. This is tolerable in other threshold matters because
disputes over the jurisdictional facts are uncommon, but they may arise
with more frequency under a cause in fact analysis.
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE AS A THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
Interpreting the fairly traceable prong of standing to require a proximate
cause analysis would eliminate the procedural difficulties created by the
cause in fact test. Whereas the nature of the cause in fact inquiry makes it
difficult to analyze causation at the outset of litigation, the proximate cause
inquiry is easily conducted at this stage, thus making it a better fit for
standing’s gatekeeper function.
This part will first determine what type of analysis would be conducted
under a proximate cause understanding of the fairly traceable requirement.
One can easily see, at least as an analytical matter, how a cause in fact
analysis is incorporated directly from tort law. In tort law, cause in fact
requires a but-for relationship between the plaintiff’s injury and the
defendant’s misconduct. As every case raising the standing issue involves
some injury to the plaintiff and some alleged wrongdoing by the defendant,
it is not difficult to figure out how to transplant this analysis into standing
law. To import proximate cause into standing, however, requires some
clarification.218
Recall that proximate cause serves a limiting function within Negligence
law. 219 Tort law has determined that defendants should not be liable for
every injury that results from their unreasonable behavior, and thus only
makes the defendant liable for those injuries for which his conduct was the
proximate cause. Today, almost all states use either the foreseeability test
or the scope of the risk test to achieve this objective. Both tests essentially
ask the same question: is the plaintiff’s injury one of the foreseeable
consequences of the defendant’s conduct that made his conduct
unreasonable in the first place?
Because of the ubiquity of the
foreseeability and scope of the risk tests, they are generally considered
synonymous with the term proximate cause.220
218. Cf. Farber, supra note 8, at 1544 (arguing that proximate cause is “an intellectual
quagmire” and that it should not be imported into an Article III standing analysis because it
would allow a court to inject its belief about what is “fair or not fair”).
219. See supra Part I.B.
220. Historically, other tests were used to perform the limiting objective of proximate
cause. The most common was the “directness” test, which asked whether the plaintiff’s
injury has been “directly” caused by the defendant’s misconduct. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG
& BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 104–05
(2010). This approach, however, proved to be of limited use as an analytical tool; whether
an injury had been “directly” caused by the defendant’s misconduct is not an analysis that
can be defined with precision. See id. at 106. The modern test, by focusing on the
foreseeability of the plaintiff’s injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct, requires an
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It is this foreseeability analysis that I propose as a new interpretation of
the fairly traceable prong of standing. In every case, a federal court would
ask the following question: is the plaintiff’s injury one of the harms that the
law, which the defendant allegedly violated, was intended to address? Like
proximate cause in the tort context, this would be a policy question, but
unlike in the tort context, this would be a legal question to be answered by
the court rather than by the jury.
To demonstrate why a proximate cause analysis within standing would
not be a jury question as it is within Negligence law, it is necessary to fully
understand how proximate cause functions within Negligence law and why
it is a jury issue in that context. Negligence law is unique in that it gives to
the jury a normative function.221 In every Negligence case, the jury is
asked to determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. This
normative role, which draws on a jury’s collective values and requires the
jury to weigh competing policy considerations, is different than the usual
role of the jury as simply a factfinder.222 In almost all other contexts, juries
are called upon to determine disputed issues of fact rather than to give
judgments about the appropriate outcome to a dispute.
Because of the unique normative role played by a jury in a Negligence
suit, the jury is also given the task of determining proximate cause. As
detailed above, the proximate cause analysis—under the foreseeability
test—requires an understanding of the reasons that particular behavior is
considered illegal. It asks whether the plaintiff’s injury was among the
risks that contributed to the decision that the defendant’s behavior was
unacceptable in the first place. In a Negligence suit, who better to answer
analysis that can be defined and explained to a jury, and in this sense is a more useful
analytical tool. See id. at 106–07 (stating that “[t]he use by modern courts of
foreseeability . . . in many respects marks an improvement” and noting that these types of
“formulations tend to frame the proximate cause requirement more elegantly and sharply”);
cf. ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 41–44 (1963) (arguing that
courts applying the “directness” test really considered the foreseeability of the risk in
drawing the distinction between “direct” and “indirect”).
221. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424–25 (1999) (“The jury has a great deal of
normative discretion in deciding what is reasonably prudent conduct.”).
222. See id. at 424 (explaining that the jury’s normative role in a Negligence claim is the
exception rather than the rule). The only other situation in which a jury performs a similar
normative function is when it exercises the somewhat controversial power of jury
nullification, in which the jury disregards normative legal standards established by other
bodies because of a disagreement with the values reflected in those norms. See Teresa L.
Conaway et al., Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U. L. REV.
393, 393 (2004) (“Sometimes, however, juries look at the law and dislike what they see, at
least with respect to the specific set of facts before them. When this happens, juries have
been known to reach verdicts contrary to what logic dictates, which is known as “jury
nullification.”). Although the concept of jury nullification is usually associated with
criminal trials, the concept does have potential application in civil proceedings as well, but
receives even less academic support than criminal jury nullification. See Lars Noah, Civil
Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1658 (2001) (“Although a number of scholars
praise aspects of unguided lay decisionmaking in this context, the case for civil jury
nullification is much weaker than in the criminal arena.”).
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that question than the jury that makes that decision? Because the jury is the
body in Negligence cases that establishes the normative requirements, they
are in the best position to answer the proximate cause question.
In order to import a proximate cause analysis from Negligence law into
the standing context, one must account for the jury’s unique role as the
normative body in Negligence law. Outside of Negligence law, normative
legal standards are established by other bodies. Legislators, both state and
federal, establish normative standards of behavior by statute.
Administrative bodies, both state and federal, set normative standards
through administrative rules and adjudications. State courts establish
normative legal standards through the common law. To apply a proximate
cause analysis in a case involving a statute or an administrative regulation
requires an understanding of the reasons the issuing body created that law
and the types of injuries that it intended to address. Obviously, the
responsibility of applying a proximate cause analysis in this context would
not fall to a jury. A jury is not equipped to determine whether the injury to
the plaintiff was among the array of risks that, for example, Congress was
concerned about when they established a normative standard through
statute.
It is telling that even within Negligence law the proximate cause analysis
is performed by the judge as a legal issue, rather than by the jury, when the
normative standard of behavior is established by a body other than the jury.
Consider a Negligence claim in which the plaintiff wishes to rely on a
defendant’s violation of a statute to prove substandard care. In most states,
violating a statute constitutes “negligence per se,” meaning that the question
of whether the defendant breached the duty of care is no longer a jury issue,
but a matter of law decided by the judge.223 In order to rely on this
principle, a plaintiff must show that the accident was the type of accident
the legislature was attempting to address224 and that the plaintiff was within
the class of victims the legislature was attempting to protect. 225 To
demonstrate, consider the case of Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co.226
In Potts, the plaintiff brought suit to recover for injuries resulting from a
spider bite sustained while unloading bananas from a truck. 227 The plaintiff
wished to establish that the defendant was negligent per se because the
company had violated a Georgia statute regulating the shipment of foods.228
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14
(2005) (articulating the negligence per se doctrine); id. § 14 reporters’ note on cmt. c
(“‘Negligence per se’ is the strong majority rule among American jurisdictions, which have
accepted Justice Cardozo’s famous holding in Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y.
1920).”). Even in states that follow this negligence per se rule, the violation of a statute can
be excused under certain circumstances. See id. § 15 (listing situations in which the violation
of a statute is excused and thus not automatically a breach of the duty of care).
224. See id. § 14 cmt. f (“Negligence per se applies only when the accident that injures
the plaintiff is the type of accident that the statute seeks to avert.”).
225. See id. § 14 cmt. g (“To invoke negligence per se, a party must show that the
plaintiff was within the class of persons the legislature was endeavoring to protect.”).
226. 301 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
227. Id. at 904.
228. Id.
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The court, rather than the jury, determined that the violation of the statute
could not be the basis of a legal finding of negligence per se because the
statute in question was “designed not to render the workplace a safe
environment, but to prevent the sale and distribution of adulterated or
misbranded foods to consumers.” 229
The court’s analysis in Potts is a proximate cause analysis, just like the
one in a typical Negligence case.230 The only difference was that the
normative standard on which the plaintiff relied was a statute created by the
state legislature, rather than a jury’s determination of the defendant’s
reasonableness. Because the normative standard had been established by a
different body, the proximate cause analysis required the skill set of a
judge, rather than a jury. In a negligence per se case, the proximate cause
analysis requires an understanding of the reasons behind a statute’s
enactment. The Restatement (Third) of Torts offers this guidance on
resolving the proximate cause issue in negligence per se cases: “In
determining the purpose of the statute, the court can rely on the ordinary
principles of statutory interpretation, including the language or text of the
statutory provision, its location within the larger statutory scheme, the more
general context of the statute, and indications of specific legislative
intent.” 231 In other words, the proximate cause analysis is a legal question
better suited for the judge.
As the Potts case demonstrates, performing a proximate cause analysis
outside the traditional context of Negligence law will almost always involve
a legal inquiry into the purposes or motivations behind the law on which the
plaintiff relies. This legal inquiry will be performed by a judge and will
place the judge in the comfortable role of determining the intent of other
political bodies. Accordingly, importing proximate cause into standing law
would bring in a legal analysis. The ultimate answers would still turn on
policy questions, but the policies would be provided by legislators and
administrative bodies. The role of a federal court would simply be to
ascertain this intent.
This type of proximate cause analysis could easily be performed by a
federal court at the outset of litigation, making it much more consistent with
the gatekeeper function that has been ascribed to standing. Indeed, this
analysis could be based solely on the plaintiff’s complaint. Particularly
after Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff’s complaint will be written with enough
specificity that a court can determine whether the plaintiff’s claimed injury
was among the harms intended to be protected by the legal rule that the
229. Id.
230. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14
cmt. f (“This statutory-purpose doctrine resembles the [proximate cause] doctrine that is
applied in ordinary negligence cases . . . .”); ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 171 (“The
[proximate cause] element is the ordinary negligence law’s analog to the threshold criteria
for imposing liability (under the rubric of ‘negligence per se’) on the basis of defendant’s
violation of a penal statute.”).
231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14
cmt. f.
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defendant allegedly violated. Unlike the cause in fact interpretation of the
fairly traceable prong of standing, no additional factual inquiry would be
necessary. In this sense, then, a proximate cause interpretation is a better fit
within standing law. Therefore, adopting this understanding of the fairly
traceable prong would avoid the tension that arises from the current cause in
fact understanding.
V. RECONCILING A PROXIMATE CAUSE APPROACH WITH THE SUPREME
COURT’S CAUSE IN FACT LANGUAGE
A proximate cause interpretation is not necessarily inconsistent with the
cause in fact language usually found in the Supreme Court’s decisions. In
reality, the cause in fact language used by the Court is largely misleading.
In early cases after the introduction of the fairly traceable prong of standing,
the Court would often use cause in fact language, but perform a proximate
cause analysis. As the cause in fact language became more and more
entrenched in the case law, the Court developed various techniques to avoid
the difficult fact-intensive inquiry required by the cause in fact analysis.
One of these techniques involved defining the plaintiff’s injury in such a
broad manner that cause in fact was obvious. Another technique was to
simply gloss over the difficult questions posed by a cause in fact analysis;
in one instance, the Court used the parties’ arguments (or lack of
arguments) as a mechanism to avoid a difficult standing analysis.232
Because of this case law, reinterpreting the fairly traceable prong of
standing as requiring a proximate cause analysis would not involve a
dramatic departure from prior precedent, and would probably be more
consistent with the original intuitions behind the Court’s creation of this
prong of standing.
A. Early Cases Based on Proximate Cause Motivations
In a 1987 opinion written while on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Bork wrote
the following with regard to the causation prong of standing: “It seems
clear that the Supreme Court's decisions about causation rest upon
something more than mere estimates of probabilities.”233 In order for Judge
Bork’s statement to be accurate, the cause in fact language consistently used
by the Court must be a façade. As explained earlier in this Article, the
cause in fact inquiry requires a guess as to how events would have
transpired if the defendant had acted legally rather than illegally. 234 This
counterfactual inquiry, by its nature, requires “estimates of probabilities.”
I believe Judge Bork’s statement is accurate, at least with regard to the
Supreme Court’s early case law interpreting the causation prong of
standing. In a series of opinions written after that prong’s introduction, the
cause in fact language used by the Court masked the proximate cause
232. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007); infra notes 296–303 and
accompanying text.
233. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
234. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
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analysis that it actually performed. Unfortunately, the Court’s proximate
cause intuitions—that the law relied upon by the plaintiff did not protect
against the injuries suffered by the plaintiff—were expressed in cause in
fact language.
This disconnect started in the opinion credited for creating the causation
prong of standing, Linda R.S. Recall that in that case, the mother of an
illegitimate child brought suit against the State of Texas and a Dallas
County District Attorney for failing to prosecute the child’s alleged father
for failure to pay child support, pursuant to a Texas state policy of
prosecuting only the fathers of legitimate children. 235 The mother claimed
that this policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. 236 Justice Marshall
concluded that the mother had no standing to bring the suit.237 In
explaining this conclusion, Justice Marshall used language indicating that a
cause in fact link between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s
misconduct had not been established.238 According to Justice Marshall, it
was “speculative” that Texas’s compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause would have resulted in child support payments being made to the
plaintiff mother.239
As detailed earlier in this Article, this language is clearly of the cause in
fact variety. 240 Despite this language, Justice Marshall’s conclusion that
the plaintiff did not have standing was almost surely based on an
understanding of the types of harms protected by the Equal Protection
Clause. It is helpful here to consider the type of evidence that would have
been relevant to a thorough cause in fact analysis in this case: information
about the particular father, such as the father’s testimony that he would
prefer making child support payments rather than jail time, or vice versa;
evidence indicating whether the alleged father, in previous situations, had
chosen a monetary penalty over jail time; or even more generic evidence
such as studies conducted about the effect prospective jail sentences have
on fathers obligated to pay child support. 241 This circumstantial evidence
could have helped the Court in performing a cause in fact analysis, but there
is no mention of any of this type of evidence in the Court’s opinion in Linda
R.S.
Other Supreme Court opinions written around the time that the causation
prong of standing was developed follow the same pattern as Linda R.S.:
these opinions use cause in fact language to describe the Court’s
conclusion, but include no discussion of the type of evidence that would
actually be relevant to a cause in fact inquiry. In Simon, the Court used
cause in fact language to deny standing to several indigents in their suit
235. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 614–15 (1973).
236. See id. at 616.
237. See id. at 618–19.
238. See id. at 618; supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text.
239. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.
240. See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text.
241. For example of this type of study, see D.L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY ch. 6
(1979).
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against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the IRS’s ruling making
certain hospitals eligible for favorable tax treatment even though those
hospitals denied regular medical care to indigents.242 Despite the Court’s
use of this language, there is no reference to the types of evidence that
would be needed to evaluate this cause in fact link. 243 In Allen, the Court
carefully delineates the steps necessary to link the plaintiffs’ harm to the
defendant’s alleged misconduct,244 but instead of carefully considering the
types of evidence that would be probative to the cause in fact analysis, the
Court dismissed a possible connection as simply “speculative.” 245 The
Court’s opinion in Warth v. Seldin246 falls into the same category: cause in
fact language is used, but the evidence that would control the cause in fact
analysis is absent. 247
In each of these cases, the cause in fact language is a façade. Rather than
performing a cause in fact analysis, the Court’s analysis is instead driven by
an intuition about the types of harms protected by the legal rules on which
the plaintiffs based their claims. In other words, the Court is performing a
proximate cause analysis rather than a cause in fact analysis. In Linda R.S.,
Justice Marshall’s conclusion that the plaintiff is without standing is based
on an implicit understanding about the types of harms against which the
Equal Protection Clause protects. Indeed, at certain places in the Linda R.S.
opinion, Justice Marshall comes close to articulating the true basis for the
Court’s conclusion. Justice Marshall notes that the Court had consistently
denied standing in cases in which the plaintiff’s suit is based on the decision
whether to prosecute a third party and the plaintiff “is neither prosecuted or
threatened with prosecution.” 248 This statement is accurate, but not because
those cases involved a failure to prove a cause in fact link between the
plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s alleged illegal conduct; it is accurate
because the purpose of most laws is to address the parties being regulated
and not to protect against harm to potential third parties. In this sense, then,
Linda R.S. can be compared to the Potts case, where the statute on which
the plaintiff relied was not intended to protect against workplace accidents
but was instead designed to protect consumers in their consumption of
food. 249 In Linda R.S., the Equal Protection Clause did not protect against
242. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28, 42–44 (1976); supra
notes 177–83 and accompanying text.
243. For instance, testimony from hospital officials or statistical evidence about the
percentage of hospitals who offer indigent care would have been highly relevant to
determining whether the IRS rulings resulted in less medical treatment for indigents.
244. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758–59 (1984).
245. Id. at 758.
246. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
247. See id. at 504–07. In Warth, low-income non-residents lacked standing to challenge
a municipal zoning ordinance for effectively excluding low-cost housing because they could
not show that such housing would exist “absent the respondents’ restrictive zoning
practices.” Id. at 504. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the record was
“devoid” of information about whether current construction efforts would result in such
housing, and that the plaintiffs’ individual financial conditions “suggest[ed]” that the lack of
housing was “the consequence of the economics of the area housing market.” Id. at 506.
248. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
249. See Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co., 301 S.E.2d 903, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
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the injuries suffered by the plaintiff but was instead designed to protect
against other types of harms. Likewise, the best understanding of cases like
Simon, Warth, and Allen is that the Court is making a determination that the
injuries claimed by the plaintiffs are not protected by the legal rule on
which the plaintiffs rely.
If the actual analysis guiding the Court’s decisions in cases like Linda
R.S. and Allen is a proximate cause inquiry, why did the Court use cause in
fact terminology?
There are three potential explanations for this
disconnect. The first is that the Court simply failed to decouple cause in
fact from proximate cause. This error is easy to make. Consider a
hypothetical involving a pedestrian who trips over a crack in a sidewalk and
breaks her arm. Suppose that the pedestrian brings suit in federal court
against the EPA for failing to enforce the Clean Air Act. Obviously, this
suit should be removed from the federal docket at the first chance, but why?
It is tempting to state that the suit should be dismissed because the EPA’s
failure to enforce the Clean Air Act did not cause the plaintiff’s injury, but
that reasoning is somewhat ambiguous because it fails to decouple
proximate cause from cause in fact. A cause in fact link could conceivably
be established between the plaintiff’s injury and the EPA’s violation. If the
EPA’s failure to enforce the Clean Air Act had contributed to global
warming, and if global warming increases the occurrences of cracks in
concrete due to increased exposure to heat, a plausible cause in fact link can
be made between the defendant’s alleged misconduct and the plaintiff’s
injury. But even if this link can be made, all would agree that the case is
without merit and should be dismissed. The dispositive reason is that,
regardless of whether enforcement of the Clean Air Act was a cause in fact
of the plaintiff’s broken arm, Congress did not intend the Clean Air Act to
protect against this type of injury. The true impediment to our hypothetical
plaintiff’s suit is not an absence of cause in fact, but a failure to establish
proximate cause. This hypothetical is similar to the situation confronting
Justice Marshall when he was charged with writing the majority opinion in
Linda R.S. The Court had concluded that the plaintiff was without standing,
and it was Justice Marshall’s responsibility to articulate the reasoning
behind this conclusion. In writing the opinion, he used cause in fact
terminology, similar to the tempting conclusion in our hypothetical that the
EPA had not caused the plaintiff’s injury. By failing to decouple proximate
cause from cause in fact, the precise reasoning behind the conclusion is
obscured.
The second reason that the Court might have initially used cause in fact
language derives from confusion regarding the role of federal courts in
determining whether the plaintiff has a constitutionally recognized injury.
For decades, both the Supreme Court and commentators have wrestled with
the question of whether the injury prong of standing limits Congress’s
ability—or presumably that of other political bodies that can create causes
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of action—to broadly define an injury under a statute.250 In Lujan, the
Court seemed to resolve that federal courts have an independent duty to
verify whether the plaintiff has a sufficient injury for Article III standing.251
The Article III injury analysis is independent of Congressional intent.
Although Congress cannot create an Article III injury where none
existed, it is an analytical mistake to assume that it is irrelevant whether
Congress has created any injury at all. On various occasions, it seems as if
the Supreme Court has made this analytical mistake. For example, in Allen,
the plaintiffs put forward different theories as to how to frame their injury.
Under the first framing, the injury existed solely because the IRS had
enforced the tax code provisions inconsistently with the law’s
requirements. 252 The Court ultimately rejected this creative framing as not
“judicially cognizable” 253 under the injury prong of standing. The Court
neglected the question of whether the plaintiff’s injury was one against
which the statute was intended to protect because, regardless, the injury still
was not sufficient to confer standing under Article III.
The plaintiffs’ second framing in Allen was to characterize their injury as
the deprivation of “an education in a racially integrated school.”254 The
Court took pains to acknowledge that this injury was “judicially
cognizable” under Article III and also “one of the most serious injuries
recognized in our legal system.” 255 In reaching this conclusion under the
injury prong of standing, however, the Court never considered whether the
statute was intended to address the plaintiffs’ injury. Consequently, the
Court fell into an analytical trap and the cause in fact analysis was used as
an escape from this trap. The Court was able to skip the statutory question
with regard to the first framing of the plaintiff’s injury because, even if
Congress did attempt to create a cause of action for those like the plaintiffs
in Allen, such an injury would not be sufficient for standing. In evaluating
the second proposed framing, the Court appeared to assume that no further
analysis of Congress’s intent was necessary because the injury was
constitutionally cognizable, overlooking the possibility of a proximate
cause analysis. Thus, to satisfy the Court’s intuition that the plaintiffs’
lacked standing, the shortcoming had to come to bear in other parts of the
analysis. Using cause in fact language is a convenient escape in this
situation because it can justify a “no standing” conclusion even if a
sufficient injury exists under the Article III injury analysis.
This leads to the third explanation as to why the Court might have
initially adopted, and continued to employ, cause in fact language in its
opinions: a desire to completely divorce the causation inquiry from the
merits of the case. As explained previously, the Court has often asserted
250. See generally Sunstein, supra note 6.
251. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–74, 576 (1992) (concluding
that Congress’s creation of a “procedural right” to sue is not sufficient to satisfy the injury
prong of the standing inquiry).
252. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752–53 (1984).
253. Id. at 754.
254. Id. at 756.
255. Id.
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this goal. 256 A proximate cause understanding of the fairly traceable
requirement is, of course, completely incompatible with this objective
because it requires an understanding of the purposes behind the law on
which the plaintiff’s suit relies. By using cause in fact language, the Court
creates the impression that the Article III standing inquiry is completely
divorced from an analysis of the substantive law that will control the case,
i.e., the merits. Of course, using cause in fact language to create this
impression is disingenuous when the Court is not really engaging in a cause
in fact analysis. Moreover, as discussed below, a cause in fact inquiry does
implicitly require an understanding of the merits of the suit. In any event, a
proximate cause understanding is completely incompatible with the Court’s
traditional notion that the standing inquiry should be divorced from the
merits and thus would explain why the Court would have chosen to employ
cause in fact language.
B. The Supreme Court’s Tactics in Avoiding a Cause in Fact Inquiry
Despite the disconnect between the cause in fact language employed by
the Court and the proximate cause analysis actually used in early cases such
as Linda R.S., the Court has continued to employ cause in fact language
when discussing the fairly traceable requirement. At some point, the cause
in fact language appears to have taken on a life its own. Although it is
difficult to discern with absolute confidence, more recent Supreme Court
cases suggest that the Court has actually engaged in the cause in fact
analysis suggested by the language in its opinions. The Court has usually
managed, however, to dodge the difficulties that arise in conducting this
fact-intensive analysis at the outset of litigation by employing various
techniques that essentially emasculate the cause in fact analysis. Under one
technique, the plaintiff’s injury is defined so broadly that the cause in fact
analysis becomes almost circular. Under another, the litigating parties are
allowed to stipulate that a cause in fact relationship existed. Both
approaches reflect a desire to avoid the fact-intensive nature of the cause in
fact inquiry.
1. Avoiding Cause in Fact by Broadly Defining the Plaintiff’s Injury
To understand the thrust of this section, consider the following truism: If
a plaintiff’s injury is defined broadly enough, a cause in fact relationship
always exists in every lawsuit. This is accurate because in every lawsuit, a
plaintiff alleges some conduct by the defendant that violates a legal rule.
The plaintiff has a subjective belief that the defendant’s conduct affects her
in some way; otherwise, the suit would not have been brought. If the
plaintiff’s injury is defined as “believing that she is injured by defendant’s
conduct,” a cause in fact relationship exists. Whether the defendant’s
conduct has caused the plaintiff physical or economic harm becomes

256. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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irrelevant if the plaintiff’s injury is broadly defined as believing that she has
been affected in some way.
This hypothetical demonstrates an interesting trait of the cause in fact
analysis: it is only as useful as the task it is asked to perform. Remember
that cause in fact examines whether there is a link between two things.
Obviously, this analysis depends upon the “things” that are to be examined
for a causal relationship change. In this sense, then, it is helpful to think of
cause in fact as an analytical machine. The machine is only as useful as the
raw material inserted into the machine for analysis. When the cause in fact
machine is asked to analyze the relationship between a plaintiff’s injury and
the defendant’s misconduct, and the plaintiff’s injury is defined as the belief
that she was injured by the defendant’s conduct, the work done by the
machine is relatively useless. In this instance, the cause in fact machine has
not failed; it is just that the raw material put into the machine was not
appropriately defined so as to make the machine’s performance useful.
In many cases, the Supreme Court has undermined the analytical
usefulness of the cause in fact analysis in this way by broadly defining the
plaintiff’s injury. By manipulating the “input,” the Supreme Court has
often been able to influence the answer produced by the cause in fact “tool.”
To demonstrate this concept, tort law is again helpful because it has more
experience in dealing with this issue. Consider the famous “lost chance”
Negligence cases, the most well-known of which is probably Herskovits v.
Group Health Co-op. 257 In Herskovits, the estate of a man who died from
lung cancer brought a wrongful death Negligence suit against a medical
group for the defendants’ failure to timely diagnose the lung cancer.258 Had
the defendants acted in accordance with the care the plaintiff alleged was
required, the lung cancer would have been detected earlier.259 Even with
earlier detection of the cancer, however, the decedent was probably
doomed: early detection only increased the decedent’s chances of surviving
the lung cancer to 39 percent. 260 Thus, more likely than not, the decedent
would have died even if the defendant doctors had diagnosed the cancer at
the time the plaintiff alleged the doctors were required to do so.261 Under a
traditional analysis using the preponderance of the evidence standard, and
assuming that the injury for which the plaintiff was suing was the
decedent’s death, the plaintiff could not prove cause in fact. The Herskovits
court, however, sanctioned an approach whereby the decedent’s injury was
defined not as the death of the plaintiff, but rather as the decreased chances
of surviving the cancer. 262 By redefining the injury in this manner, proving
cause in fact becomes a very straightforward process. If the decedent had a
39 percent chance of survival if he had received a timely diagnosis based on
257. 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983); see also ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 147
(“Herskovits became the leading case for the ‘lost opportunity’ doctrine.”).
258. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 475.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 476–77.
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appropriate medical conduct, but only a 25 percent chance of survival after
the misdiagnosis, the defendant’s improper conduct is a cause in fact of a
14 percent reduction in the plaintiff’s overall chances of survival. 263
With this tort background, one can better appreciate the many cases in
which the Supreme Court seems to manipulate the definition of a plaintiff’s
injury in order to avoid a difficult cause in fact analysis, just as the court recharacterized the plaintiff’s injury in Herskovits. This has most often
occurred in the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence, and probably most
famously in the landmark case of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke. 264 In Bakke, a white male who had been denied admission to the
School of Medicine at the University of California, Davis brought suit in
California state court challenging the school’s racial quota admissions
program. 265 The California lower court determined that the admissions
program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 266 but refused to issue an injunction requiring the plaintiff to
be admitted to the medical school because the plaintiff “had not carried his
burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the
constitutional and statutory violations.” 267 The case was appealed to the
California Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court’s determination
that the medical school’s admission policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause, but ordered that Bakke be admitted.268 This decision was appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court. 269
At the Supreme Court, Bakke’s standing to bring suit was challenged by
amici, but not by the California State defendants. 270 Nevertheless, the
Court properly acknowledged that it was necessary to verify standing,
regardless of the arguments of the actual litigants in the case, because
standing was an Article III jurisdictional requirement.271 The Court faced a
difficult cause in fact question in Bakke: if the injury to Bakke was his
failure to gain admittance to the school, would Bakke have gained
admission under an admissions program that complied with the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause? This first requires a
determination of what an admissions program that complies with the Equal
Protection Clause looks like. As Bakke and subsequent cases demonstrate,
263. See id. at 479.
264. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
265. See id. at 269–70 (opinion of Powell, J.).
266. See id. at 270.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 270–71.
269. See id. at 281.
270. See id. at 280 n.14.
271. See id. Because Bakke’s suit was originally filed in California state court, it was
actually not necessary to establish Article III standing for the state court litigation. See
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1989). This issue was not resolved by the
Supreme Court until after Bakke, and the Court has continued to treat Bakke’s standing
analysis as relevant. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City
of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 665 n.4 (1993) (explaining that Bakke’s standing holding is
not dictum, despite the Court’s opinion in ASARCO Inc.).
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a school has some flexibility in considering the race of an applicant in an
effort to achieve a diverse student body. 272 Thus, it is not an easy task to
predict whether Bakke would have been admitted under a constitutional
admissions program because there are a multitude of different programs that
would comply with the Equal Protection Clause: an admissions program
that considers only empirical test results would clearly be constitutional;
one that considers test results and scores students on the basis of interviews
would also be constitutional; a similar program that also considers race as a
factor in order to ensure a diverse student body would also be
constitutional.273 Bakke would presumably fare better under some of these
admissions programs and more poorly under others; Bakke appeared to
have relatively strong test scores, but he had applied late to the medical
school one year and earned poor interview scores another year.274
In its standing inquiry, the Court sidestepped these difficult cause in fact
issues by simply redefining the injury, much like the Washington Supreme
Court had done in the Herskovits case:
[E]ven if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been
admitted in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he
lacked standing. The constitutional element of standing is plaintiff's
demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by
favorable decision of his claim. The trial court found such an injury, apart
from failure to be admitted, in the University’s decision not to permit
Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his
race. Hence the constitutional requirements of Art. III were met. 275

This practice of re-characterizing a plaintiff’s injury so as to avoid a
difficult cause in fact standing inquiry has been duplicated in many Equal
Protection cases. 276 This practice was nicely summarized by Justice
272. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–43 (2003) (upholding the
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program designed to achieve a
diverse student body).
273. See id.
274. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276–77 & n.7 (opinion of Powell, J.).
275. Id. at 280 n.14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Despite dodging the difficult
cause in fact issue at the standing level, the Court still had to grapple with the same issue
when it considered whether an order requiring Bakke to be admitted to the medical school
was appropriate. Here, the Court shifted the burden of proof onto the school to prove that
Bakke would not have been admitted under a constitutional admittance program, and held
the school to its earlier stipulation that it could not meet this burden, despite the defendants’
apparent change in litigation strategy on this issue at the Supreme Court level. See id. at 320
n.54 (“There is no occasion for remanding the case to permit [the medical school] to
reconstruct what might have happened if it had been operating the type of program described
as [constitutional in this opinion]. . . . No one can say how—or even if—petitioner would
have operated its admissions process if it had known that legitimate alternatives were
available. . . . In sum, a remand would result in fictitious recasting of past conduct.”
(citations omitted)). Although a plaintiff is usually saddled with the burden of proof in civil
litigation, there is some support in tort law for shifting the burden of proof on the issue of
cause in fact to the defendant. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (shifting
burden to defendants of disproving cause in fact when the defendants’ negligence had
deprived the plaintiff of proof on the cause in fact issue).
276. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“The [quota
program] denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public
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Thomas in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General
Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville 277:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the
barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the
barrier in order to establish standing. The “injury in fact” in an equal
protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting
from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the
benefit. 278

The Court has also used this technique to avoid difficult cause in fact
inquiries outside the Equal Protection context. For instance, in Watt v.
Energy Action Educational Foundation,279 the State of California brought
suit against the Secretary of the Interior claiming that the Secretary was
required, pursuant to federal statute, to experiment with other methods of
auctioning oil and gas leases for federally owned property on the outer
continental shelf, besides the methods historically used by the Secretary.280
California had a financial interest in the revenues generated by these
government auctions because the federal government was required by
statute to share the revenues from these leases with the states neighboring
Whether the
the corresponding areas of the continental shelf.281
experimental bidding system would be applied to California’s lease tracts
and increase its shares was unclear, and the Secretary argued before the
Supreme Court that this point defeated cause in fact.282 The Court avoided
this difficult inquiry, however, by simply re-characterizing the injury that
California suffered; the injury to California was not the loss in revenues, but
instead that the Secretary had “breached a statutory obligation to determine
through experiment which bidding system works best.” 283
Broadly defining a plaintiff’s injury is not necessary illegitimate. Cases
like Herkovits and Bakke clearly show that redefining the injury in the cause
in fact analysis has analytical usefulness so that conclusions regarding
cause in fact comport with our intuitions regarding when recovery should
contracts based solely upon their race.”); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (1984)
(“[T]he right to equal treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not co-extensive with any
substantive rights to the benefits denied the party discriminated against.”); id. at 740 n.9
(“Here . . . there can be no doubt about the direct causal relationship between the
Government’s alleged deprivation of appellee’s right to equal protection and the personal
injury appellee has suffered—denial of Social Security benefits solely on the basis of his
gender.”); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970) (“We may assume that the [plaintiffs]
have no right to be appointed to the . . . board of education. But [they] do have a federal
constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously
discriminatory disqualifications.”).
277. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
278. Id. at 666.
279. 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
280. See id. at 158.
281. See id. at 160–61.
282. See id. at 161.
283. Id.
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be allowed. This technique, however, is a very slippery slope. If a
plaintiff’s injury is defined so broadly that the plaintiff’s subjective belief
that she was harmed by the defendant’s behavior is sufficient, cause in fact
ceases to have any analytical relevance. Thus, there must be normative
limits as to how expansively the injury can be framed. In tort law, these
normative controls exist in the form of an entrenched body of law that
dictates what sorts of harms can be the basis of recovery in a tort suit and
when the suit must be brought. Herskovits was an exception to the normal
rule that a plaintiff’s injury under Negligence law is defined in terms of
bodily injury or death; 284 by defining the injury as the increased chance of
avoiding death, rather than the actual death itself, the Herskovits court
avoided a prohibitive cause in fact analysis.
Indeed, even in a
straightforward wrongful death case, normative controls are necessary in
defining the plaintiff’s injury. Unless an implicit time control is inserted
into the framing of the injury in a wrongful death suit, the cause in fact test
would never be met: “But for the defendant’s negligent behavior, would
the plaintiff have died?” The answer of course is, “Yes, eventually,”
because we are all destined to die at some point. 285 Therefore, in a
wrongful death suit, the injury to the plaintiff is not death, but actually the
amount and quality of life of which the defendant deprived the plaintiff by
his negligence. This is reflected in the calculation of damages in a wrongful
death claim. 286 Thus, in the tort law context, defining the injury for the
cause in fact test works within established parameters.
These baseline rules are bedrock components of the entire torts system.
Because the way that an injury is defined can be determinative of the cause
in fact analysis, and further, because cause in fact is a core component of a
torts system based on retribution, allowing exceptions to the fundamental
rules regarding how tort injuries are framed (as occurred in Herskovits) can
potentially undermine the entire thrust of American tort law. This is why
the authors of the Restatement (Third) of Torts have cautioned against
extending cases like Herskovits outside the specific context in which they

284. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 4
(2005) (defining “[p]hysical harm” as the “impairment of the human body . . . or of real
property or tangible personal property”).
285. See CHUCK PALAHNIUK, FIGHT CLUB 17 (1996) (“On a long enough time line, the
survival rate for everyone will drop to zero.”).
286. Here, again, Palahniuk is on point when describing Chloe, a character from his novel
Fight Club, whose health is quickly deteriorating from a fatal disease: “[I]n that brainy
brain-food philosophy way, we’re all dying, but . . . [not] the way Chloe was dying.” Id. at
37. For a more legal (but similarly sad) description of the damages currently available in
wrongful death actions, see Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a
New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 1–6 (2005).

2011]

THE CAUSATION PRONG OF STANDING

1293

occurred, namely medical malpractice situations,287 and why most courts
have agreed with this warning. 288
These normative limits to defining the plaintiff’s injury must also exist
within standing law for a cause in fact inquiry to have any teeth. An
interesting issue arises, however, in considering potential sources for those
limits. The most logical source is the substantive law relied on by the
plaintiff as the basis of her suit. For instance, when Justice Thomas
explained in City of Jacksonville why it was permissible to frame the
plaintiff’s injury as the loss of an opportunity to compete for government
contracts without racial discrimination, Thomas focused on the basis of the
plaintiff’s suit—the Equal Protection Clause.289 The irony here is that by
examining the purposes of the substantive law relied on by the plaintiff in
order to determine whether a broad framing of the plaintiff’s injury is
appropriate, the Court is engaging (in a roundabout fashion) in an inquiry
very similar to the proximate cause analysis that asks (in a straightforward
manner) whether the plaintiff’s injury is one of the harms protected against
by the substantive law relied on by the plaintiff. In tort law, these two
inquiries are distinct: tort law generally establishes the normative limits on
how the plaintiff’s injury is to be framed; proximate cause performs the task
of analyzing the reasons why the defendant’s behavior was considered
negligent in the first place. The proximate cause analysis is a “fact”
question because the jury creates the substantive law regarding what
constitutes reasonable behavior; the Herskovits question as to the
appropriate framing of the plaintiff’s injury is a pure legal question that
requires a judge to consider the common law of torts. In the standing
context, these inquiries are necessarily conflated: the substantive law that
forms the basis of the plaintiff’s suit must be the source for determining
both the appropriate definition of the plaintiff’s injury for a cause in fact
analysis and whether this injury, properly framed, is one of the harms
against which the law in question was intended to protect. Ironically,
because the cause in fact analysis is useless without substantive limits on
framing the plaintiff’s injury, and because the most logical source for these
limits is the substantive law relied on by the plaintiff, a cause in fact inquiry
cannot exist without an inquiry that, like a proximate cause inquiry, requires
an understanding of the purposes of that law.

287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. n (“Without limits, this reform is of potentially enormous scope, implicating a large
swath of tortious conduct in which there is uncertainty about factual cause, including failures
to warn, to provide rescue or safety equipment, and otherwise to take precautions to protect a
person from a risk of harm that exists.”).
288. See, e.g., Simmons v. W. Covina Med. Clinic, 260 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776–78 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (refusing to recognize the Herkovits “lost chance” doctrine in a case for
“wrongful birth” and “wrongful life”).
289. The “injury in fact” in an Equal Protection case of this variety is the denial of equal
treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the
benefit. See supra notes 277–78 and accompanying text.
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To demonstrate this point, consider again the case of Linda R.S. There,
the Court used cause in fact language, but did not actually perform a cause
in fact inquiry that evaluated the probability of successfully tracing the
plaintiff’s injury to Texas’s alleged Equal Protection Clause violation.290
Suppose, however, that the Court had actually engaged in the cause in fact
analysis suggested by its opinion and had considered testimony and other
evidence about the alleged father’s likely response to a Texas policy of
prosecuting all fathers who were delinquent in their child support payments.
If the Court had engaged in this analysis and concluded that no cause in fact
link had been established, the plaintiff might have argued that her injury
should instead be framed the way the Court had done in Bakke. 291 If Linda
R.S.’s injury was simply the opportunity to seek child support payments
from the father of her illegitimate child under a Texas legal scheme
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, then a causal link exists
between her injury and the defendants’ Equal Protection Clause violation.
Under this framing, the defendants were certainly a cause in fact of her
injury because the injury and the legal violation are one and the same. As
in Herskovits and Bakke, the cause in fact analysis becomes circular: the
legal violation is essentially the injury itself, so by definition, the injury is
caused by the legal violation.
To justify a conclusion that the plaintiff was without standing, it would
have been necessary for the Court in Linda R.S. to articulate why the
plaintiff’s proposed broad framing of her injury was incorrect. This
conclusion would most logically be based on an interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause: it is not appropriate to frame Linda R.S.’s injury as the
lost opportunity to seek child support payments because the Equal
Protection Clause was not intended to protect against harm to third-parties
due to the inequitable administration of criminal laws. Notice the
similarities between this analysis under the cause in fact inquiry and a
proximate cause analysis. Under the cause in fact analysis, the Court must
determine the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause to ascertain whether
the plaintiff’s framing of her injury is appropriate. Under a proximate cause
analysis, the same analysis occurs but in a more straightforward manner;
the Court simply asks whether the Equal Protection Clause protects against
the injury complained of by the plaintiff. Both analyses require an
examination of the substantive law’s purpose or intent, and thus neither can
be conducted without consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s suit.
Because of the similarities between these two analyses, it is difficult to
discern whether the Court is actually committed to a cause in fact inquiry in
those cases that use cause in fact language and yet define the plaintiff’s
injury so broadly that a rigorous cause in fact analysis is not needed. These
290. See supra notes 60–71 and accompanying text.
291. See Barry Matsumoto, Weeping for Hecuba: Why Should We Weep for Strangers?,
3 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 677, 686 (2000) (“[O]ne can see that the critical choice which
the Supreme Court made in [Linda R.S.] was not the application and interpretation of the
causation and efficacy of relief requirements but rather the selection or characterization of
her injury.”).
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cases are just as easily explained by a proximate cause understanding of the
fairly traceable requirement; the conclusion that a broad definition of the
plaintiff’s injury is appropriate is consistent with a proximate cause
conclusion that the plaintiff suffered an injury against which the substantive
law was intended to protect. A cause in fact analysis is more easily
identified in those cases in which a broad framing of the plaintiff’s injury is
rejected and standing is denied pursuant to a rigorous cause in fact analysis,
but there are very few of these cases in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
Outside of the early Supreme Court cases that established the fairly
traceable requirement, it is exceedingly rare to find a case in which the
Court has denied standing under that prong of standing. The number of
cases in which the denial is based on a clear cause in fact analysis is even
smaller. Franklin v. Massachusetts 292 and Department of Commerce v.
United States House of Representatives 293 are two of these rare cases. Both
involved the reapportionment process associated with the census,294 and in
both, the Court’s use of a cause in fact analysis is clear from the language
used and evidence cited in the opinions. 295 This rather small sampling of
cases, however, is somewhat scant evidence in favor of a conclusion that
the Court has been applying the cause in fact inquiry in suits where the
plaintiff’s injury is broadly defined.
Despite the persistent existence of cause in fact language in the Court’s
opinions, the most that can be said is that there is current confusion as to
whether a cause in fact analysis is actually employed. The numerous cases
in which the Court defines the plaintiff’s injury so broadly that a cause in
fact inquiry is analytically useless are just as consistent with a proximate
cause interpretation of the fairly traceable prong of standing. At the least,
the Court’s penchant for broadly defining a plaintiff’s injury indicates a
desire to avoid a fact-intensive cause in fact analysis.
2. Using the Parties’ Arguments to Avoid a Cause in Fact Inquiry
Another technique the Court has used to avoid a difficult cause in fact
analysis is to allow the parties to stipulate that the fairly traceable
requirement is met. This troubling technique was used in Massachusetts v.
EPA. 296 In the case, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought suit
against the EPA over the EPA’s decision not to regulate certain greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles. 297 Massachusetts claimed that the
EPA erred in concluding that it did not have the power to regulate

292. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
293. 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
294. See id. at 320; Franklin, 505 U.S. at 790.
295. See Dep’t of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 330 (discussing specific evidence relevant to a
cause in fact analysis under the standing inquiry); Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802 (“Appellees
have shown that Massachusetts would have had an additional Representative if overseas
employees had not been allocated at all.”).
296. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
297. Id. at 505.
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Moreover,
greenhouse gas emissions of new motor vehicles. 298
Massachusetts claimed that the EPA had no authority to refuse to regulate
the greenhouse gas emissions. 299
The Court found that Massachusetts had asserted an injury sufficient for
Article III standing because Massachusetts was losing coastal lands to
rising seas. 300 Turning to causation, the Court ducked some of the
incredibly difficult cause in fact hurdles inherent in linking the EPA’s
alleged misconduct to the plaintiff’s harm by accepting the EPA’s
stipulation. The Court noted that the “EPA does not dispute the existence
of a causal connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming.” 301 If a cause in fact inquiry is truly part of an Article III
jurisdictional analysis, however, the arguments or stipulations of the parties
before the court were irrelevant, just as they were in Bakke.302 The Court
has an independent duty to verify that the Article III requirements are
met. 303
If Massachusetts’s injury was the loss of coastal land due to rising seas, a
cause in fact inquiry linking that injury to the EPA’s alleged misconduct
would require a causal connection between “manmade greenhouse gas
emissions and global warming.” 304 Obviously, global warming is one of
the more contentious contemporary issues in American politics.305 One
understands why the Court desired to avoid the issue and thus eagerly
grasped onto the stipulation made by the EPA. Indeed, the Court even
tiptoed around the issue in its introductory paragraph of the opinion. 306 A
cause in fact understanding of the fairly traceable requirement, however,
would have forced the Court to make this determination at the threshold of
this litigation as part of the Court’s independent duty to verify jurisdiction
over the case.

298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 520–23.
301. Id. at 523.
302. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978).
303. See FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 (1990) (“Although neither
side raises the issue here, we are required to address the issue even if the courts below have
not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us. The federal courts are
under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing ‘is perhaps
the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 750 (1984)) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
304. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523.
305. See Lee Dye, Opinion, Global Warming and the Pollsters: Who’s Right?, ABC
NEWS (June 16, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/DyeHard/global-warming-pollsclimate-change/story?id=10921583 (“On the surface, it appears that Americans are deeply
divided over the issue [of global warming].”).
306. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504–05 (“A well-documented rise in global
temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related.”).
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CONCLUSION
The Court’s approach in the Massachusetts case clearly reflects a
hesitancy to engage in a full-fledged cause in fact analysis as part of the
threshold inquiry of standing. There is good reason for this tentativeness.
As this Article has detailed, a cause in fact understanding of the fairly
traceable prong of standing creates difficult procedural challenges. A
proximate cause understanding of the fairly traceable requirement
eliminates these difficulties. In addition, a proximate cause understanding
is consistent with the original motivations that spurred the development of
that prong of standing. At the very least, if the Court were to formulate a
proximate cause understanding of this requirement, it would no longer be
necessary for the Court to engage in some of the mental gymnastics
discussed in Part V that seem obviously motivated by a desire to avoid the
fact-intensive nature of the cause in fact test.
Adopting a proximate cause understanding would not eliminate the
necessity of proving a cause and effect relationship in litigation. This
analysis could simply be conducted as part of the merits of the case and
would thus incorporate the normal procedures available in civil litigation
for resolving contested factual questions. The case of Texas v. Lesage307 is
a prime example of this concept. In Lesage, after the plaintiff was denied
admission to the University of Texas’s Department of Education Ph.D.
program, he brought an Equal Protection claim under § 1983 challenging
the school’s affirmative action admissions policy. 308 The case proceeded
into discovery, at which point the school sought summary judgment based
on the overwhelming evidence that the plaintiff would not have been
admitted regardless of the affirmative action program. 309 The district court
granted summary judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed in a per
curiam opinion. 310 The Court reasoned that, because the plaintiff had not
established a but-for causal relationship between the plaintiff’s denial of
admission and the school’s affirmative action program, he had not
established a cognizable claim under § 1983.311 There are obviously
similarities between this case and Bakke, where the Court avoided a cause
in fact inquiry as part of the threshold standing determination by broadly
defining the plaintiff’s injury. 312 But Lesage reiterates that failing to
conduct a cause in fact analysis at the outset does not foreclose a cause in
fact analysis as part of the underlying merits of the suit, where the issue can
be resolved through the normal procedural tools available in federal civil
litigation.
Although a proximate cause understanding of the fairly traceable prong
of standing would resolve the problems discussed in this Article, two
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

528 U.S. 18 (1999).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21–22.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978).
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potential issues arise. First, a proximate cause interpretation would be
inconsistent with the idea that the standing analysis can be conducted as
separate from the merits of the case. In reality, however, the current
doctrine does not achieve this result. The cause in fact analysis itself can be
considered part of the merits of the case, as Lesage demonstrates.
Moreover, determining how to frame the plaintiff’s injury for purposes of a
cause in fact analysis requires an understanding of the purposes underlying
the substantive law on which the plaintiff relies. In this sense, then, a
proximate cause understanding of the fairly traceable prong of standing
would simply make explicit what is currently implicit:
that any
interpretation of the fairly traceable prong of standing will require an
examination of the merits of the dispute.
Second, a proximate cause understanding would essentially duplicate the
analysis that the Court has sometimes conducted in statutory cases under
the prudential “zone of interest” test. 313 The prudential zone of interest test
is indistinguishable from the proximate cause analysis I have proposed in
this Article. Some reconfiguring of standing doctrine would be needed to
avoid repetitive and duplicate analyses, but this would be preferable to the
current state of affairs, where it is not even clear what type of analysis is
required by the fairly traceable prong of standing.
These issues aside, it is important to appreciate that a proximate cause
understanding would serve a limited purpose within the broader objectives
of standing law. If standing ultimately derives from separation of powers
concerns, 314 a proximate cause understanding of the fairly traceable prong
would further these objectives only in the sense that it would require a
federal court to consider whether the body that created the substantive law
relied on by the plaintiff (usually a state legislature or Congress) intended
for the law to be used in the manner that the plaintiff seeks to use it. This
analysis would be deferential to the political branches of government that
establish substantive standards of conduct and in this sense is consistent
with the overarching separation of powers objectives of standing law.
The proximate cause understanding could not, however, further all of the
separation of powers concepts represented by standing law. While it would
allow the judiciary to ensure that the substantive law produced by other
branches of government was not being misused, it would not be an effective
tool for determining whether these other branches exceeded the limits of
Article III. Stated differently, while a proximate cause understanding
would prevent the judiciary from independently exceeding the limits
described in Article III, it would not be an effective check on the other
branches. This function, however, can either be performed by the injury
prong of standing or, as one commentator has recently suggested,

313. See supra note 4 (discussing the “zone of interest” test of non-constitutional
prudential standing).
314. See generally Elliott, supra note 5 (arguing that the current doctrine does not further
the separation of powers functions attributed to it).
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conducted completely outside of standing doctrine.315 Indeed, simply
because standing doctrine serves separation of powers concerns does not
mean that all separation of powers concepts need be crammed into this
doctrine, which was originally devised to specifically address the plaintiff’s
ability to bring suit. In any event, these topics are beyond the scope of this
Article. It is clear, though, that a proximate cause understanding of the
fairly traceable prong of standing would be a good start toward a more
cohesive and orderly standing doctrine.

315. See generally Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781 (2009) (suggesting that the separation of powers functions
typically attributed to standing more naturally derive from Article II of the Constitution).

